Introduction:

This study focuses on the main changes that occurred in the activities of the Islamic State in Syria during the year 2021. This year saw many changes at different levels, both at the political level, as we witnessed a change in the approach of American foreign policy after John Biden succeeded Donald Trump as President of the United States of America, and in terms of changes in the positions of the main actors at the local and regional levels, and last but not least in terms of economic and social developments resulting from the spread of the coronavirus around the world especially in the countries of the region plagued by wars and conflicts.

Analytical reading:

A look at the distribution and nature of operations carried out by the Islamic State in 2021 clearly shows that the nature of the targeting of the operations has changed, as the use of IEDs and explosives has decreased, which can be explained by the organization’s scarcity of resources or the difficulty of accessing raw materials that can be used to conduct these operations. It is still clear that the organization has refrained from operations involving cars or booby traps, which can be explained by the organization’s attempt to reduce its human losses. The analytical study also shows that the organization has moved from complex targets and operations with extensive planning to launching limited operations against small targets or so-called soft targets exposed during movements in open areas or lacking control and air cover, where it was clear that there were no casualty data on the Russian side, both because of the media blackout imposed by Russia on such operations and because Russian forces move according to a certain military pattern that includes air cover of Russian forces in open and hot areas.

What is different?

Although ISIS rapid and blitzkrieg attacks remain the most common pattern in terms of the type of attacks carried out, followed in second place by attacks relying on explosives and IEDs, the main difference in 2021 is the decrease in operations conducted with IEDs compared to 2020. That represents about 15% of total operations. While attacks using light weapons were almost the same in 2020 and 2021, it is noticeable that military operations relying on the use of medium-range weapons increased significantly compared to close-range weapons, as the number of artillery strikes more than doubled, which mainly targeting the headquarters of Iran-backed militias, based in Deir ez-Zor province, while Syrian regime forces and militias loyal to the regime were the main targets of direct military operations, alongside the Syrian Democratic Forces, mainly focused on the length of the lines of movement and movement in the Syrian steppe, as well as on the southern side of the Euphrates River in the eastern sector of the countryside of Deir ez-Zor governorate. Both types of combat operations underwent a remarkable evolution in 2021, namely the organization’s shift to a comprehensive approach against Iranian forces and pro-Iranian militias compared to 2020. For example, the number of direct attacks by the Islamic State with light and medium weapons against pro-Iranian militias increased from only 3 in 2020 to over 50 in 2021. Overall, it can be said that the Islamic state’s operations against various pro-Iranian militias increased by about 125 percent between 2020 and 2021. This apparent shift between the targeted parties by the organization comes against the backdrop of the increasing obstacles it faces in terms of mobility and implementation in Syrian Democratic Forces areas compared to Syrian steppe areas. In the absence of official Islamic State media, it is also difficult to definitively determine whether the various operations against these militias are actually carried out by agents of the organization or by locals using similar methods to the organization. Thus, these targets can also be interpreted as an ideological reaction to the operations to spread Shiism carried out by various Iranian parties under the cover and protection of pro-Iranian militias. Almost half of these operations took place on the road between Palmyra and Deir ez-Zor, which is one of the main support and supply lines for these militias based in the steppe of Deir ez-Zor. The large number of operations along this road can also be interpreted as an indication of the high rate of movement of these militias along their supply lines, which is normal given the tensions in the east of Deir ez-Zor governorate between various regional actors, particularly between pro-Iranian militias and US forces stationed on the north bank of the Euphrates.

On the other hand, the number of operations against civilians cooperating with the Syrian Democratic Forces within the Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria decreased slightly in 2021 compared to 2020. In general, civilians of various affiliations, whether working with the Syrian regime or with the Autonomous Administration or of the rest of the civilian population, were most heavily targeted by the Islamic State, accounting for about 30% of total operations, followed by the Syrian Democratic Forces and Syrian regime forces, accounting for about 22% of total operations, and then militias loyal to Iran. Despite this distribution in the number of targets, Syrian regime forces have suffered the most casualties, nearly 40% of the total number of injuries and deaths in 2021 as a result of Islamic State operations.

Casualty Analysis

Although at first glance it can be said that the organization’s activities have decreased in different regions, based on statistics and figures, this change is nothing, as the organization’s operations in 2021 decreased by only 5% compared to 2020. At the same time, however, the organization seems to be taking a different approach to targeting and influencing. Despite this slight decrease in the number of operations in general, the number of victims of the operations carried out by the organization has increased by about 15% compared to the victims and fatalities in 2020.

It is difficult to predict the main reason for this change and the increase in casualties and deaths, but this undoubtedly reflects some kind of deterioration in the ability of the various actors to take adequate measures to protect their fighters and allies from ISIS attacks. As mentioned earlier, Syrian regime forces suffered about 40% of the total casualties, while Syrian Democratic Forces suffered about 10%, a percentage close to the casualties of pro-Iranian militias. However, it is worth noting that the number of casualties among the Syrian regime forces increased significantly in 2021, by about 12% compared to 2020 and that the number of casualties and deaths among the pro-Iranian militias increased very sharply compared to 2020.

Conclusion

The figures in this analytical study show that it is too early to judge that ISIS has lost its ability to perform various operations, because it is clear that it is still able to move and carry out various types of operations, especially in open areas such as the Syrian steppe.