Introduction:

The Islamic and jihadist movements in Syria have occupied international attention as Syria has undergone major changes as a result of the development of the Syrian war, in parallel with the violent and bloody transformations that the various Islamic movements, especially the jihadist organizations, have experienced at the level of ideology, structure, and alliances. The theory of politics, the form of the state, and the application of Sharia are the main catchwords of the theoretical conflicts between these organizations, while a constant competition for the influence, resources, and administration of the regions is being fought. In pre-revolution Syria, there was no public space that allowed the emergence of “Islamic movements” or even “Islamists” outside the framework of the traditional religious institution, while the Syrian revolution provided an exceptional space for the emergence, expansion, and transformation of new Islamists or new Islamic currents, from the beginning of the peaceful revolution and even more so after it became armed, and this multiplied with the expansion of the liberated territories and the emergence of competing projects on the ground or the legitimacy of the representation of true Islam internally or the political conflicts over Syria externally. In 2013, Syria witnessed a phase of differentiation from the revolutionary movement to the emergence of the Salafist-Jihadist discourse before the local movements underwent a period of continuous revisions and developments in political visions and international relations. ISIS was not separated from the wave of concern by these realities and transformations, from which its Syrian branch split off to operate in the name of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. This study offers an explanation of the main current jihadist movements in Syria, with the exception of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and ISIS, because we will make a specific and independent study for each of them:

Turkistan Islamic Party:

This is a group of Uyghur Muslim fighters who arrived in Syria in small numbers with their families from their homeland in China (Xinjiang Province, northwest of China) in late 2013 under the banner of “jihad” through Turkish territory before gradually becoming the core of one of the most organized jihadist groups. The party also began its activities by attracting the “Uyghur mujahideen” inside Turkish territory by opening a “jihadist” website in Turkish and the Turkistan Islamic magazine that it publishes. Arguing that “if China has the right to support Assad in Syria, we have the right to support Syrian Muslims,” according to the March 2013 issue. The party made Syria a second base for its advanced operations after Afghanistan in recent years. A large number of Uyghur refugees in Turkey (about 20,000) made it easy to recruit fighters from their ranks to join the “party,” which used Turkish territory as a base for its activities with the contempt and support of the Turkish side. The “East Turkistan Solidarity and Education Association” plays a pivotal role in recruiting fighters and preparing them to leave for Syria under the guise of “humanitarian support for the Syrian people.

Turkestan Party initially settled in the mountains of the coast and in the western countryside of Idlib, in the border areas with Turkey, and their numbers increased year by year until, in early 2016, the number of Turkistan Islamic Party fighters reached about 7000, and they were joined by a large number of Syrians, including former fighters from the Jund al-Aqsa faction and fighters from Halfaya in Hama countryside and others, as well as the Al-Ghuraba Brigade, which is affiliated with the Turkestan banner and whose fighters are of Palestinian nationality. Less than a year later, the formation of the “Turkistan Islamic Party”, led by (Abdul Haq al-Turkistani), was announced in late 2014. Turkestan fighters started their first official battle in their official name, namely the “Battle of Jisr al-Shughour City” in April 2015, which earned them the most famous among the organizations after their significant contribution in controlling the city and the villages and towns in its surrounding areas with the rest of the factions, playing the spearhead during these battles through suicide operations by detonating booby traps and blowing themselves up with explosive belts, and many of them were killed during these battles. Therefore, Jisr al-Shughur is of symbolic value to Turkistan Party since they have raised their banner in its center. Turkistan fighters have also participated in limited numbers in many battles in northern Syria (Idlib and Aleppo countryside), once under the banner of “Jabhat al-Nusra”, once under the banner of “Ahrar al-Sham” and during the recent fighting in Idlib under the banner of the “Army of Conquest”.

The Turkestan Party deployed in areas stretching from the city of Jisr al-Shughur and its western countryside to the Turkmen and Kurd mountains in the northern countryside of Latakia, as well as in the al-Ghab Plain. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra) had handed over to the Turkmen Party as a “token of friendship” some villages that Jabhat al-Nusra had taken under its control. Previously, many of these areas were considered Turkestan Party settlements, especially the villages of Al-Zanbaqi and Katrin, which are considered reasonably safe due to their proximity to the Turkish border, which protect them from airstrikes and shelling, and contain training camps. There are also other camps in Shandrich village, such as Sad al-Shagar, which has experienced dozens of airstrikes by Syrian and Russian warplanes.

The Turkistan Party fighters initially preferred to isolate themselves in areas where there was no one because of the different cultures, customs, and traditions. However, the situation changed with time and with the growth of their numbers. Turkestan Party fighters began to unite and mix with Syrians in their areas, as in villages inhabited by citizens of the Alawite sect during the control of government forces and now under the control of the Turkestan Party, such as Ishtabraq and others, in addition to the villages of Halouz, Alaia, Ghassaniya, Kafr Din, Al Jamiliya, and Kaurgo, which is under their control with Tahrir al-Sham. TIP is also active in trade, agriculture, and the sale of crops, having controlled many villages, whether from people forced to flee during the fighting in the countryside of Jisr al-Shughur and the coastal mountains and others or by seizing them by fatwas from its major partner Tahrir al-Sham. Thus, trade and the sale of crops became one of the sources of income and material support for Turkestan in the region, in addition to the “spoils” they captured in previous battles in the Al-Ghab Plain, the Latakia Mountains, and the western countryside of Idlib. The latter were the spoils of Kefriya and Al-Fu’ah, inhabited by citizens of the Shiite sect and were displaced under an international agreement in return for the displacement of Sunni citizens from villages surrounding Damascus.

Moscow has declared this group a banned organization since 2006, and Beijing considers Islamic Party members to be separatist terrorists, and Washington considers one of the Taliban’s arms in East Turkestan and the world.

Guardians of Religion

It is a group that believes in and is affiliated with the ideology of al-Qaeda. The formation of Guardians of Religion was a process of rebellion that began in 2016 within Tahrir al-Sham when it split from al-Qaeda. The formation of Guardians of Religion coincided with violent fighting in northern Syria between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Syrian Liberation Front (Ahrar al-Sham and al-Zenki).

The organization is led by Samir Hijazi (Abu Hammam al-Shami), a former member of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the branch of al-Qaeda in Syria between 2013 and 2016. Abu Julaybib Tubas and Abu Khadija al-Urduni (members of the Shura Council of the Guardians of Religion) also left Jabhat Fateh al-Sham in 2016 due to its disengagement from al-Qaeda and were both killed in 2018. Tubas, al-Shami and Sami al-Uraydi had been arrested by Tahrir al-Sham in November 2017, to prevent the formation of a group affiliated with al-Qaeda in Syria, which would later be released.

The Guardians of Religion Organization is mainly stationed in advanced positions on the lines of contact with the regime’s forces, particularly in the northern countryside of Hama, Turkmen Mountain in the countryside of Latakia and in the southern countryside of Aleppo, in addition to Barisha Mountain and al-Zawiya Mountain in the western countryside of Idlib near the Turkish observation points and near the two international highways M4 and M5, where the organization concentrates its operations in sensitive areas mainly in confrontation with the regime. They are about 2000 fighters, most of them from the Arabian Peninsula, called “Al-Jazrawyah”. The Guardians of Religion includes many factions, most of which previously worked within the framework of Tahrir al-Sham, including the “Jaysh al-Malahem”, “Jaysh al-Sahel”, “Jaysh al-Badia”, “Kabel Brigade” and “Jund al-Sharia”.

At a time when most of the northern Syrian factions were committed to the de-escalation agreements and accepted the Turkish army’s deployment of observation points inside Syria, the Guardians of Religion Organization rejected these agreements and participated in establishing a new operations center dubbed as “Rouse the Believers,” which announced its continuation of military operations. The organization also rejected the Sochi agreement, calling it a grand conspiracy.

In 2019, the U.S. State Department officially categorized the Guardians of Religion as a foreign terrorist organization and offered a sum of money under the Rewards for Justice Program in exchange for information on three of its leaders, including al-Uraydi. The coalition has dealt heavy blows to the organization by targeting its influential leaders, as they have jihadist legitimacy among the organization’s fighters. Perhaps the most important thing these leaders have is their ability to publicize their ideology and bring opponents of Tahrir al-Sham into the ranks of the Guardians of Religion.

The group claims to have carried out some 200 attacks in a variety of rural areas and small towns since its establishment, including 12 locations in Aleppo, 16 in Hama, 7 in Idlib and 15 in Latakia. Recently, in January 2021, some Russian soldiers were injured when a car bomb exploded near their base in Tal al-Saman, in the northern part of Raqqa governorate (northeastern Syria), in an attack claimed by the organization. This is the first attack of this kind by an extremist group on Russian troops in Raqqa and also the first carried out by the “Guardians of Religion” outside their area of operations in Idlib in northwestern Syria.

And although U.S. forces have targeted many of its leaders and suffered casualties from the Tahrir al-Sham-led security campaigns on the ground, Guardians of Religion has some field leaders and others such as Sami al-Aredi and Abu Hammam al-Shami, in addition to the leaders held by “Tahrir al-Sham” in its prisons, and still maintains small groups operating behind the lines. And it continues to maintain contacts with the parent organization, al-Qaeda. And it also has an ongoing funding network. However, it has retreated significantly following the operations of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, which decided to remove Guardians of Religion with the Turkish consent to promote itself as an (organization you need to talk to).

The Caucasian Mujahideen

The Caucasian Mujahideen emerged in the Syrian war in May 2013 and their members were distributed among all extremist Islamic organizations. The Caucasian Mujahideen formed one of the most important groups of foreign fighters in Syria. The first Chechen jihadist group was known as the “Muhajireen Battalion” in 2012 and paved the way for the emergence of the Caucasian Mujahideen in Syria. The emergence of “Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar” under the leadership of Abu Omar al-Shishani, who joined ISIS while a large number of members of his battalion remained under the banner of Jabhat al-Nusra, and here the Caucasian loyalties were divided between ISIS and al-Nusra, ended the period of fragmentation by declaring jihadist organizations independent of ” ISIS and al-Nusra” and accepting Caucasian fighters only under the pretext of the takfiri approach followed in each of them. Among the most famous of these organizations (Jund al-Sham, Ajnad al-Caucasus, Jaysh al-Usra and other organizations that split from the Caucasian organizations, such as the organization of “Saif Allah al-Shishani”, who split from the organization of “Abu Amr al-Shishani”, which we will study in detail later.

The Russian authorities succeeded in weakening the local resistance in the Caucasus by enabling these fighters to shift the conflict to Syria, as they facilitated their exit from the North Caucasus to Syria through the Turkish gate. In addition, some factors encourage Caucasians to go to Syria to wage jihad, especially the difficulty of jihad in the republics of Chechnya and Dagestan due to the brutal methods used against them by the Russian security forces. Most of these people are organized into groups that pledge allegiance to Al-Qaeda, some directly, others through its branch in Syria, al-Nusra Front.

Fighters from the North Caucasus make up a large part of the jihadist fighting force in Syria. In 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin estimated the number of Russian citizens fighting in Syria at about 4,000 fighters, which is consistent with many independent estimates. The largest group of these fighters is from Dagestan.

Ansar al-Din Front

Ansar al-Din Front is a jihadist alliance, announced on July 25, 2014, and included two groups: Harakat Sham al-Islam and Harakat Fajr ash-Sham al-Islamiya. They have stated that they are not affiliated with any other party. The Green Battalion was among the signatories and members of this alliance, but in October 2014, the battalion pledged allegiance to the leader of Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar and was incorporated into this faction, which announced its separation from the alliance and pledged allegiance to Jabhat al-Nusra on September 23, 2015. The alliance sought to remain neutral in the conflict between ISIS and other groups, and the groups affiliated with the coalition have multiple affiliations; Most members of Harakat Fajr ash-Sham al-Islamiya are Syrians from the Aleppo region, while Harakat Sham al-Islam is made up of Moroccan fighters, while the Green Battalion includes mainly fighters from Saudi Arabia, and Chechen and other Russian-speaking fighters make up the Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar.

On December 10, 2016, the organization announced in a statement, “The components of Ansar al-Din Front and its battalions, represented by Harakat Fajr ash-Sham al-Islamiya led by Dr. Abu Abdullah al-Shami and Harakat Sham al-Islam led by Abu Muhammad al-Baydawi, have decided to announce the full integration and complete fusion,” with the new formation being led by Abu Abdullah Al-Shami.

Harakat Sham al-Islam

Founded in August 2013 by three Moroccan prisoners released from Guantanamo Bay, Ibrahim Benchakroun, Ahmed Mizouz and Mohamed El Alami. Harakat Sham al-Islam first gained prominence because of the role it played in the 2013 “Kasab” attack in Latakia. The following year, the group was one of the three main factions that participated in the 2014 Latakia attack, along with Jabhat al-Nusra and Ansar al-Sham and engaged in battles near Al-Kindi Hospital and Aleppo Central Prison.

The group lost its most prominent leaders, Ibrahim Benchakroun, known as “Abu Ahmed al-Muhajir,” founder and emir of Sham al-Islam, and Abu Ahmed al-Maghrabi, who was the emir of the raiders and mastermind of the attack on the countryside of Latakia. Both were killed by the Syrian regime in the battle for Latakia. And Abu Safiya al-Masri, military field commander of Harakat Sham al-Islam, and Abu Hamza al-Mughrabi, who served as military and field commander on one of the fronts in Latakia. All this led to a significant decline in the organization’s performance and made it ineffective in the field. “The organization’s Shariah committee was disbanded, and most of its members joined Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS.

Harakat Sham al-Islam was an organization associated with Benchekroun’s personality, so his organization died with the death of its leader. The organization is currently led by Muhammad Mazuz, known as “Abu al-Izz al-Muhajir” in Syria. He was pledged allegiance as the emir of the organization and is considered one of the most prominent detainees at Guantanamo Bay and one of the founders of Harakat Sham al-Islam in Syria, who joined the front ranks of the war in Syria.

The United States has placed Harakat Sham al-Islam, to which most Moroccan fighters in Syria belong, on the list of global terrorism issued by the US State Department.

Harakat Fajr ash-Sham al-Islamiya

The organization was founded in mid-2012 by many young men in the countryside of Darat Izza city in western Aleppo to participate in the liberation of Darat Izza city and large parts of west Aleppo, which led to the liberation of large areas of Aleppo city. It also fought many battles under the name: “Harakat Fajr al-Islamiya” before joining Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya and participating in battles under its name. It soon separated from it, and its name became what it is now, “Harakat Fajr ash-Sham al-Islamiya.” It also contributed to establishing the Ansar al-Din Front, which is on the American blacklist of terrorist organizations. The organization comprises a small percentage, no more than 5%, of the Arab and foreign fighters who fight alongside it in the battles against the regime, most of whom are of Turkish nationality. It was one of the largest factions in Aleppo and was led by the doctor “Abu Abdullah al-Shami”, one of the former Islamist prisoners in the famous Sednaya prison. Harakat Fajr ash-Sham al-Islamiya is also considered one of the oldest Islamist fighting factions in Aleppo and the surrounding areas. It has taken an Islamic approach since its inception. Like other Islamic groups, it operates in an organized and institutional manner in several offices. Since its founding, the organization has provided many martyrs in various battles, most notably in the battle to liberate the strategically important town of Khanasir and in the battle to liberate al-Jandoul.

Jihad Coordination:

The “Jihad Coordination” was established in mid-2020 by the dissident leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham “Abu al-Abed Ashda’ “. The Jihad Coordination later became involved in an operations center dubbed “Be Steadfast,” which was formed on June 12, 2020, and disbanded just ten days after its establishment.

Tahrir al-Sham has arrested Abu al-Abed Ashda’ on 12. September 2019 at his headquarters in the Mohandessin countryside, southwest of Aleppo, and issued a decision stripping him of all his leadership positions, including the leadership of “Omar Ibn al-Khattab Army” of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, against the backdrop of his statements against the leadership of Tahrir al-Sham, in which he spoke about the administrative and financial corruption and the mistakes committed by the leaders of the senior leadership, “Ashda'” criticized the leadership at the time in relation to the military performance in the battles in northern Hamas, which began in May 2018, which was the reason for the loss of the territories one after another, as “Ashdaa” claimed in his accusations against the leadership of Tahrir al-Sham. And he was sent to the military court for “slander and speeches that only serve the enemies of the nation and drive a wedge…” said a statement by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Later, after the intervention of mediators from the city of Aleppo, from which “Abu al-Abed” came.

Abu al-Abed Ashda’ hails from the eastern neighborhoods of Aleppo city, and has alternated between many Islamist and jihadist groups. He defected from “Ahrar al-Sham” in late 2016, along with more than 200 fighters who were under his command in the “Ashda’ Mujahideen” battalion, which withdrew with the rest of the opposition groups as part of the agreement signed with the regime in late 2016 to clear the eastern neighborhoods. In early 2017, Ashda’ and his battalion joined the ranks of “Tahrir al-Sham” and took command of the military bloc of Aleppo city. He then became the leader of the “Omar Ibn al-Khattab Army” and assumed administrative duties and various positions in “Tahrir al-Sham.”

The two Egyptians Abu al-Fath al-Farghali and Abu al-Yaqzan al-Masri defected from “Tahrir al-Sham” after it announced its support for the Turkish operations “Euphrates Shield” and “Olive Branch” north of Aleppo. Abu al-Abed Ashda’ and Issam al-Khatib, who joined their colleagues months later after the factions lost the area east of the Hijaz Railway in the countryside of Idlib and Hama to the regime forces, after blaming al-Julani and his leaders and accusing them of corruption and negligence. They are the leaders of the nascent “Jihad Coordination”, whose members are estimated at two hundred.

The Ansar Combatants Brigade

Abu Malik al-Tali, the former leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, after repeated resignations, objections and boycotts of the “Tahrir al-Sham” leadership, which he then retracted and reconciled with it …etc, announced the formation of his own faction, named “The Ansar Combatants Brigade” in 2017, in what is seen as a new blow to Abu Muhammad al-Julani, while the gains of his rivals in the “Guardians of Religion” organization seem to be doubling, at a time when many claim that this nascent alliance will soon break apart, which will not take long.

Jamal Zainiya (Abu Malik al-Tali) is considered one of the founders of “Jabhat al-Nusra” and has led its branch in the Qalamoun region surrounding Damascus since 2012. This branch was one of the most important groups of “Al-Nusra” due to its strategic location, i.e. smuggling routes and receiving fighters from abroad via Lebanon. The first time Al-Tali’s name was mentioned in the media was in the summer of 2013 when there were confrontations between the “Al-Nusra Front” and the other factions on the one hand and ISIS on the other. At the time, Al-Tali confirmed that the fighters of ISIS in Qalamoun were under his protection, as he believed that they were different from their leadership and did not support its practices.

Later, like all the other regions, Al-Tali found himself confronting ISIS in Qalamoun in the end, but after he revealed himself as one of the hard-line faces of Al-Nusra, who will later lead to a split and weakening of the organization. Despite the positive image shown by Al-Nusra branch in Qalamoun during the so-called case of Maaloula Sisters, in which Al-Tali himself led the negotiations, the hard-line leader image tended to stick to him.

Abu Malik made millions of dollars from the deal to release Christian nuns held captive by his fighters in the Maaloula city in 2014. But the figure remained the subject of friction between Al-Tali and the leadership of “Al-Nusra,” which left the issue in limbo and used it every time Al-Tali opposed Al-Julani. The figure varied between one million and four million dollars, but the wealth of the “Al-Nusra” offshoot in Qalamoun is considered by many to be much more enormous. And there is talk of huge sums that Al-Tali gained from the exchange of prisoners and bodies with “Hezbollah” and the regime, as well as from smuggling and arms trafficking that allowed him to control some of the main smuggling ports.

Regardless of the actual amount of wealth, the leadership of the “Al-Nusra Front,” controlled by Al-Julani and Abu Maria Al-Iraqi, gave Al-Tali free rein to dispose of it. But in exchange for keeping quiet about the high return Al-Nusra is said to have received from the famous Four Cities deal in 2017. According to this, al-Tali also moved from Qalamoun to Idlib, where he invested his money in profitable economic projects such as food trade, real estate, banking, and money transfer.

It is fair to say that this wealth is the main strength that makes al-Tali of great interest to the Guardians of Religion Organization, which hoped Abu Malik would join them from the first moment their leaders split from Jabhat al-Nusra in 2016 and their announcement of the new faction in 2017. But wealth aside, al-Tali has proven that he has enough sophistication to profit from also invest in the contradictions around him, which is confirmed by his latest move by declaring an alliance with the Guardians but not joining them, i.e. standing in the middle of the road.

The Ansar Combatants Brigade is estimated at 300 fighters.

Green Battalion

The Green Battalion is a jihadist group that was active during the Syrian revolution. It was founded in 2013 by Saudi veterans who had participated in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The group fought alongside the Nusra Front and the Islamic State against the Syrian government forces. It has remained independent and distanced itself from the conflict between ISIS and other groups. On July 25, 2014, the group announced its merger with Ansar al-Din Front. It later announced its affiliation with Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar in October 2014.

Ansar al-Islam

They are an extension of the Iraqi group Ansar al-Islam, which adopt jihadist Salafism. However, they are independent fighters and do not belong to any jihadist group, and most of the leaders of this organization were Iraqis. The so-called Ansar al-Islam group was founded in 2012. This group was strong in its early days, and came into conflict with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, especially since it had a considerable amount of weapons and equipment and a large number of fighters. And it relied on the method of street warfare, possessing a large number of tanks and “RPG” missiles, which it used in attacking the Syrian regime’s positions in Damascus. During 2013 and late 2013, the group began to disintegrate due to personal differences and disputes between its leaders and operatives.

On March 21, 2014, the group was able to re-establish a branch in the south of Damascus and Quneitra by merging with the Osama bin Zaid Brigade, Al-Ezz bin Abdul Salam and Al-Adiyat Brigade). In February 2015, it announced the establishment of its northern offshoot in the Idlib governorate and was active mainly in the northern countryside of Lattakia. The group also joined the Rouse the Believers operations center established in October 2018 and participated alongside opposition factions in fighting against regime forces and allied militias in Damascus and its countryside, the Hasakah battles, the control of Raqqa, the battle of Menagh military airport in Aleppo, the siege of Aleppo Central Prison, the battles of Aleppo and raising the siege on it, the battles of Hama, the coast and its countryside, and the control of Idlib governorate. The group includes about 300 fighters deployed on the fronts against the Syrian regime in the coastal mountains of northwestern Syria. And it seeks to fight the Syrian regime and its allies, and it does not interfere in the governance and management of affairs in Idlib. The group does not have popular or media support, nor does it have the ability to attract young people, which makes it unimportant and not threatening to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

Ansar al-Tawhid

This organization is considered an extension of the Jund al-Aqsa faction, founded in mid-2012 by “Abu Abdul Aziz al-Qatari,” who was killed in mysterious circumstances in 2014. His body was found in Deir Sunbul town, near the headquarters of the (dissolved) Syria Revolutionaries Front, and Jamal Maarouf, the front leader, was accused of liquidating him. The “Jund al-Aqsa” adopted the Salafi jihadist movement. And it refrained from fighting ISIS completely, and it was accused of being ISIS sleeper cells. The number of its fighters ranges between 800 and 1,000. Due to the continued violations of the agreements and the continuation of the “suppression” against the factions and the takfir against all of them by Jund al-Aqsa, HTS announced the beginning of its military operations against it in a statement issued by it on 13 February 2017. And in mid-February 2017, after the start of fighting between HTS and Jund al-Aqsa, the latter perpetrated a massacre of about 70 fighters of the opposition factions in the Khazanat area near the city of Khan Sheikhoun in the southern countryside of Idlib, and after five days of violent clashes in the countryside of Hama and Idlib, in which dozens of people on both sides were killed, the two parties agreed that the members of Jund al-Aqsa would only be allowed to leave with their light weapons to the areas controlled by ISIS in Raqqa and that the prisoners of both parties would be released.

And in March 2018, the groups affiliated with the Jund al-Aqsa organization that remained in the city of Sarmin, most of whom are from this city, announced the formation of the faction “Ansar al-Tawhid” in connection with the arrival of some ISIS fugitives to the opposition areas, after the organization lost large areas in favor of the SDF and the International Coalition. In late April 2018, the al-Qaeda affiliated Guardians of Religion Organization and the Ansar al-Tawhid faction announced their merger into a single alliance called the Alliance in Support of Islam.

In October 2018, Ansar al-Tawhid, along with the Guardians of Religion Organization, Ansar al-Din Front, and Ansar al-Islam Front, formed the “Rouse the Believers” operations center. In mid-2020, the “Ansar al-Tawhid” faction operating in Idlib and the surrounding region announced its complete independence and disengagement from all internal and external entities, including the “Rouse the Believers” operations center. The military core of Ansar al-Tawhid remained under the leadership of Khaled Khattab, who is the same military commander of Jund al-Aqsa. Ansar al-Tawhid took Sarmin, where most of its fighters belong to ISIS, as its headquarters. With the support of the factions and in coordination with the Turkestan Party and with al-Qaeda-affiliated immigrant groups, it carried out special operations to repel the advance of the regular army until the fighting ended with the setting up of Turkish observation points. After that, Ansar al-Tawhid’s presence continued, although it lacked resources and means, and the harassment of the other factions and preventing it from carrying out any unsatisfactory military operations and controlling the military decision in northern Syria by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham after swallowing the main factions. There was a kind of disagreement and tension between the two parties, so HTS pursued Ansar al-Tawhid’s operatives and leaders for rebelling against HTS ‘s decisions and reclaiming the stolen money and weapons, and sometimes for carrying out military actions without consulting and coordinating with it as the largest faction controlling the scene. But later the military coordination was resumed, forced by the military reality and the advance of the Syrian regime with Russian support. Another reason for coordinating with them is that it benefits from the quality of Ansar al-Tawhid fighters and their experience and military training in intense battles that require a well-trained ideological fighter.

Ansar al-Tawhid has repeatedly stated that it rejects and is not interested in international agreements and treaties such as Astana, Sochi and Geneva because they contradict its principles and jihadist ideology. This has made it a target of the international coalition and the Russians. Most recently, the coalition attacked an Ansar al-Tawhid camp in Kefraya town near Idlib.

Conclusion

The Islamist phenomenon in Syria has emerged from the reality of conflict and chaos. These organizations had no previous experience of a stable environment or political system, so they were characterized by a high degree of flexibility, transformations, and inter-conflicts. But the revolutionary movement in Syria was a motivation for ideological, rhetorical, and strategic shifts in the new Islamist and jihadist movements. The continuous transformations of the phenomenon can be read in the context of the ongoing challenge and response in the reality of a complex and constantly evolving conflict. The organizational weakness and lack of a comprehensive structural framework of the Free Army constituted a strong motive for these jihadist movements to continue to expand, especially in northern Syria. And it is the same weakness that the Islamist movement suffers from that is not affiliated with the jihadist or Salafist current that is closest to the traditional institution or ideas of political and active Islam. However, it is a weakness caused by the dominance of factional reality, at a time when the map of the factions in Syria in general, and in northern Syria in particular, is heading towards fewer formations and larger mergers, if the factions of the Free Army do not resolve their structural crisis within the framework of a comprehensive umbrella and thus get rid of these organizations, whether through military action or by joining the ranks of other factions that are recognized internationally and according to certain criteria.