Introduction:

Despite the great defeat suffered by ISIS in Syria and Iraq, especially after the end of the Baghouz battles in Deir Ez-Zor governorate in eastern Syria in March 2019 and the killing of its former emir, “Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi” on 26 October 2019 and its spokesman “Abu al-Hassan al-Muhajir”, in addition to the killing and arrest of at least 40 senior leaders of the organization, and the loss of its areas of control, as it no longer has absolute control over the land, but the end of military control of the organization has not prevented the cells of the organization resume their activities against the forces of the regime and the Russian and Iranian forces loyal to it, in addition to some operations in the areas controlled by the “SDF” east of the Euphrates, confirming that the organization’s issue is not yet resolved, and the recent fighting in Ghweran Prison and the surrounding neighborhoods in the city of Hasaka has proven that it is capable of returning and closing its ranks in the absence of a genuine willingness to eliminate it once and for all, perhaps to invest its presence in a way that serves certain parties that we will mention in our study.

Presence and funding:

The Syrian steppe is a fertile and favorable environment for ISIS and a factor of strength to regroup and launch any military action against any other party in control in Syria. This environment allows ISIS to receive external support and activate the sources of logistical support from inside Syria, as the Syrian desert is geographically open to the Iraqi desert, which allows ISIS to get some logistical support in Syria, despite the strict measures taken by the Iraqi government on the Syrian border, to limit the organization’s activities and operations in this area, and also benefiting from the absence of any genuine military willingness to fight the organization in these areas, this area is either without any local military force or occupied by the forces of the Syrian regime and its allies such as Russia and Iran, in addition to the symbolic American presence in Al-Tanf. The cells of ISIS have chosen the Syrian steppe and the eastern Euphrates as theaters for their operations, particularly in the Syrian steppe in the area of Al-Saan, Jabal Al-Bashri, Khanasser, the area of Al-Sukhnah, near the city of Palmyra, and in the southern countryside of Deir Ez-Zor Governorate. The central leadership of ISIS is applying the method of giving the branches of the organization almost unlimited authority to identify targets and carry out attacks, which increases the effectiveness of this tactic by targeting military convoys, oil tanks, and commercial convoys to obtain military supplies. In addition, most of its activities relied on ambushes and surprise and quick attacks without holding territory for fear of being attacked, as opposed to the old method of using booby-trapped cars and vehicles to reduce casualties in the human element, which is currently desperately needed. This method used by the organization aims to maintain the momentum of the organization’s operations and the continuation of its media presence, establishing its presence and spreading hope in the hearts of its “supporters”, as well as avoiding the sense of frustration due to the military losses and the decline of its areas of control, in addition to re-imposing itself as a major player in the region, and also benefiting from the inability of the local forces (the regime and its allies) to launch continuous and long-term security campaigns or to conduct multiple operations simultaneously or to secure fully restored areas, which requires large financial and logistical capacities to cover the associated costs, which is very difficult given the current circumstances and economic hardship. This is compounded by the lack of adequate cooperation with the local population, where the organization benefits from tension and mistrust between the local population and the other dominant forces. The organization employs various means to maximize factors, whether through media and psychological propaganda by its members spread in local communities, or to lure individuals through monetary payments.

funding

With regard to funding, the organization still has a large fortune estimated at $300 million, according to United Nations estimates as of August 2019. It is believed to have been able to hide it through banking and trade laundering networks or through secret hideouts, which was recently confirmed. According to the Syrian Observatory and local news networks, a security patrol of the General Intelligence Department in Deir Ez-Zor found a tunnel connecting the commercial bank building to Mohassan School, in which it found money, quantities of gold and documents related to the leadership of ISIS, as well as many weapons, and the security personnel took out the confiscated items and transported them to the General Intelligence Command in Deir Ez-Zor. And on November 10, 2020, the National Defense Forces and pro-Syrian government clans discovered hideouts in the desert and a network of underground tunnels in an area in Jabal al-Bishri in the Syrian steppe, south of Raqqa and north of the town of Sukhna. These hideouts contained various weapons and equipment. The members of the organization used these hideouts to store weapons and explosives, and they were converted into military headquarters and residences. In addition, weapons, equipment, sums of money in foreign currencies and gold were found in these caves. ISIS has conducted millions of dollars worth of trade during its control of large parts of Syria and Iraq, and has also minted a special gold coin with the “state” logo. This challenge is an important factor for ISIS. In most cases, it will not redeploy its ground forces before creating the objective conditions to resume its direct military activities in order to reduce operational costs.

The raids that were mentioned are also one of the most important sources of funding for it.

ISIS activity

The year 2021 witnessed significant activity from ISIS and effective operations in individual areas of the Syrian steppe within the regime’s territories, and increasingly so in conjunction with the continuation of Russian airstrikes and periodic military and security campaigns by regime forces and militias loyal to the regime and the Russians. In addition to security operations by international coalition forces with Kurdish forces in the eastern areas they control at the expense of the organization. Sleeper cells, many former leaders and operatives of the organization were targeted. However, all of these operations were not as fruitful as they should have been.

ISIS numerous attacks and ambushes on regime forces and their loyal militias, especially in the desert of Rusafa and near Jabal al-Bishri in the countryside of Raqqa, as well as raids and fighting in the Athriya area, and other fronts in eastern Hama, in the steppe of Sukhna, in Palmyra in eastern Homs, and in the steppe of Deir Ez-Zor, as well as on the administrative borders between Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor, in which it was able to kill many members of the regime forces and militias loyal to the regime inside the Syrian steppe, while the organization lost many of its members to Russian airstrikes and clashes with the regime forces and militias loyal to the regime. The number of casualties from March 2019 until today, according to the statistics and documentation of the Syrian Observatory, 1,640 deaths of the regime forces and the militias loyal to the regime of Syrian and non-Syrian nationalities, including at least 3 Russians, and 160 of the militias loyal to Iran of non-Syrian nationalities were killed in attacks, bombardments and ambushes by ISIS in the western Euphrates, Deir Ez-Zor desert, Raqqa, Homs, Sweida, Hama and Aleppo, while 1,600 ISIS fighters were killed during the same period.

As for the seam areas and the areas of influence of the Kurdish forces, the attack of ISIS on Ghweran Prison and the nearby neighborhoods on January 20, 2022, i.e. at the beginning of this year, was the biggest and most prominent event that absolutely confirmed that the organization is not finished, as it killed 98 of the Asayish, prison warders, the anti-terrorist forces, the SDF and the Self-Defense and seven civilians in this attack, in addition to about 100 others who have not been identified, about half of them are prison staff and members of the Self-Defense Forces and other military forces, according to the Syrian Observatory’s statistics, while some 268 ISIS fighters were killed, in addition to dozens of ISIS fighters who fled without the Kurdish forces being able to arrest them or even knowing their whereabouts.

At the same time, ISIS operations continue at a relatively steady pace, as evidenced by armed attacks and assassinations in various forms in different SDF areas. The number of SDF fighters and civilians who have been killed in SDF-controlled areas since July 2018 to date is approximately 800 people. The Syrian Democratic Forces confront the organization’s operations with periodic security campaigns conducted with the International Coalition, targeting the cells of the organization and those accused of being involved with it. However, these campaigns have not brought security or stability to these areas. The areas of northeastern Syria, where there was a stronghold of the organization, are subject to constant monitoring of any return of the organization’s fighters to these areas. This task is carried out by a large number of Syrian Democratic Forces fighters, most of whom are Kurds supported by U.S. Special Forces and the International Coalition. They also guard thousands of ISIS fighters and their families in overcrowded prisons in the camps they control in northeastern Syria.

The camps and prisons that house thousands of ISIS fighters and families and are under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces, such as al-Hol camp where most ISIS families are located, are a prime target for the organization’s cells. Moreover, there are hundreds of “cubs of the caliphate” in the camp who are steeped in the extremist ISIS ideology and in whom the organization sees the great hope for its revival on a regional and global level, competing all countries that seek to bring back children of different nationalities from all over the world after many of them have been brought back by their home countries. It is estimated that 12,000 ISIS fighters are in Syrian Democratic Forces prisons, in addition to 70,000 of their relatives in camps also controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces.

The organization is currently developing and changing its mode of operation in the Syrian desert according to its capabilities, as we have already mentioned, by spreading in the form of active security cells in different areas of the Syrian steppe. The mission of the organization is to use these cells to attack the leaders, military and commercial convoys in the Syrian steppe and the northeastern Euphrates, and to spread terror in the region and between the fighting factions in the region and the clans there to ensure that they do not join or ally with the Syrian Democratic Forces or the regime forces, as well as to secure the smuggling and support lines and networks in the Syrian desert. And the number of the organization’s fighters is estimated at 3,000.

Although the effectiveness of ISIS has increased significantly in the past year 2021 and at the beginning of 2022 compared to 2020 after the announcement of its elimination, the organization is well aware of the need to expand and control populated areas that will be the shelter and breeding ground for the rebirth of the organization. The main goal of this step will be to increase the number of the organization as well as the resources and thus the survival of ISIS threat, which is supported by the complex security, military and political environment in Syria.

Are we about to witness the third birth of ISIS?

The resumption of ISIS operations indicates that the U.S. intends to put pressure on the governments of Syria and Iraq to engage in counterterrorism operations and to exert military and economic pressure. This indicates that one of the goals of this organization or those in charge of it is that there should be no commercial or social contacts between Damascus and Baghdad, hitting economic capacities, especially related to oil wells, agriculture and wheat in the steppe. Moreover, reviving ISIS or maintaining it without eliminating it sends a message to Russia, as is the case in Syria, so that a state of terror and panic created by reviving the sleeper cells of the organization. But this return of the organization does not have to be in the same form and with the same appearance as the previous one, that there will be forces and an organized army, as we have seen in Raqqa and other areas in Iraq and Syria, which was evident from the behavior of the organization in the last period in Iraq and Syria when it carried out surprise operations, such as targeting or shooting down patrols of the Syrian army through individual actions, not through an organized attack. For these and the above, conditions appear ripe and in the interest of a return of the organization exploiting the chaos in the Syrian desert, and according to the following reasons:

1. The ruggedness of the steppe’s geography, the mountains and valleys that help hide and maneuver, and the impossibility or difficulty of entirely controlling it, specifically since it does not move following the land-holding strategy as we mentioned.

2. Local communities’ weak opposition to the organization, in addition to the chaos and recurrent disputes between the main forces inside and outside.

3. The organization’s ability to recruit and regroup, whether from new or released members, and the presence of numerous sleeper cells and groups using the same tactics in different areas of control.

4. The lack of seriousness of the international community to fight the organization and eliminate it once and for all.

5. Relying on alternatives that are not accepted by the population, such as the SDF, the Shiite militias, in addition to the forces of the regime that have proven their failure and inability to manage and organize, in addition to the many violations and accusations leveled against them against the Sunni community.

Conclusion

We note that ISIS knows very well that the Syrian desert cannot be a suitable environment for the existence and development of the organization. It needs to expand and control populated areas and villages in order to increase the organization’s members, whether by force or voluntarily, taking advantage of the deteriorating economic situation in the different areas of control. In addition to increasing its resources and consequently growing and restoring the strength of ISIS, which is supported by the complex security, military and political environment in Syria and the lack of seriousness of the international parties to remove it, at a time when the main actors in Syria are preoccupied with other priorities. Although international coalition and the Syrian regime, supported by its allies, continue the policy of undermining the capabilities of ISIS by targeting its senior leaders through airdrops or airstrikes, and also pressuring local populations to cooperate under the Rewards for Justice Program by providing information that helps capture other leaders in exchange for money. And although many internal and external influences limit the organization’s activity, the factor of influence and foreign investment is still the most significant and fortunate in the organization’s third birth process, even though it does not have the same strength, expanse, and influence. All data indicate that it will come if the reasons leading to it are not addressed.