Prepared by: Muhammad Sulayman

This study examines the details of the Shiite militias operating in Syria, the motives for their intervention, and the possible scenarios for their existence. In addition to the prominent bloody role which they played in supporting the Assad regime against its opponents since the start of the Syrian revolution until the date of preparing the study; by committing many crimes against the rebellious Syrian people, represented in genocides, forced displacement of the population of the rebellious regions, and killing the activists and men of the revolution, as part of a well-studied strategy for the Iranian regime to control Syria.

This strategy began to appear shortly after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, through its adoption of the “Al-Murtaza Association” headed by Jamil al-Assad (brother of Hafez al-Assad). However, al-Assad, the father, nipped the idea in the bud, as he was keen that no one would share with him in power, even if in favour of him and supportive of his policies. That is why the Iranians have only used the soft power to penetrate the Syrian society to distort its national identity.

When Bashar al-Assad assumed power, Iranian activities began to appear in public because of his weak personality and his lack of complete control over the functions of the state. That was through spreading Shiism, building Husseiniyas and Ḥawzas, holding mourning marches, opening schools and religious institutes that adopt the Shia sect in their curricula, spreading the Persian language and sending student missions to Iran.

Perhaps the most dangerous thing Iran has done is buying many properties in the centre of Damascus, the capital, and has focused on specific areas (such as the vicinity of the Umayyad Mosque, Sayyida Ruqayya, and Sayeda Zainab).

At that period, Iran did not appear to have any military or security activity except on a limited scale. Once the Syrian revolution broke out, the Iranians initially worked to provide Assad with a security system led by senior law enforcement officers in Iran, which helped Assad withstand the first wave of popular demonstrations. But the unexpected development of the events of the Syrian revolution, the control of the Free Syrian Army over many areas, and the direct threat to the institutions of power, especially in Damascus, prompted Iran to intervene by the Revolutionary Guards and its leader, Qassem Soleimani, managed the operations of the Iranian forces and his militias in Syria until his death in early 2020 by US forces near Baghdad Airport.

During this period, in addition to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Iran brought in many of its sectarian militias from Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Pakistan and some countries in which it has influence. The number of these militias reached about fifty groups.

The motives of the Iranian intervention

Iran experienced political isolation in the Arab region and the regional environment, especially in the first Gulf War, and Syria was Iran’s only ally in the Arab world.

The excellent relation that Hafez al-Assad built with the Khomeini regime allowed Iran to move east towards the Mediterranean and expand its influence in Lebanon, which was under Assad’s military control. This political presence in Syria and Lebanon, which turned into an economic and military, allowed the Iranian project to expand and opened the road between Tehran and Beirut. Syrian geography represents a “link” between Iraq and Lebanon in Iran’s strategic project, the “Shiite Crescent”, which means political, economic and security influence over the most important seaports and geographical spots in the region, to preserve its national security by maneuvering within the borders of other countries, and to transport its natural gas to Europe. The geographical location of Syria constitutes a vital strategic economic corridor towards the global market.

The Syrian border with Israel is also an instrument of international pressure that enables it to make some gains. Syria also has borders with Lebanon, and has a high degree of influence there and embraces Hezbollah, which is considered Iran’s proxy force inside the Lebanese state.

Iran has worked to strengthen its expansion project (the Shiite crescent) through the demographic and sectarian change of the main cities located in the heart of this crescent, by force when possible, as in Baghdad after 2003, and Beirut and Damascus now, through the purchase of properties, activities Spreading Shiism, and buying Loyalty.

Iran transformed Hezbollah’s military strength and its popular expansion in the region after the 2006 war into a new form of political and military control.  As it did in Beirut in 2008, it has turned Lebanon into a zone of all-Iranian domination and has progressively withdrawn it from the influence of the Assad regime.

Based on the above, the Syrian revolution in 2011 posed a real threat to break an essential part of the Shiite Crescent, whose construction took about three decades of work and hundreds of millions of dollars. However, after overcoming the shock period, Tehran was partially able to turn the threat into an opportunity.

Although Bashar al-Assad’s regime had given Iran great privileges to move inside Syria, it was a security regime that held the country firmly and tightly, so the freedom of movement for the allies remained restricted after all the privileges they obtained. And it remained able to blackmail and demand prices in return for any expansion of presence or to enable local partners in Syria and Lebanon, or to use Syrian territory for the benefit of third parties.

The great collapse that the Assad regime experienced since the end of 2011 gave the Iranians an opportunity to reshape the relation with it, as it turned from the relationship between (equals) to the relationship between (subject and object), the regime became in the status of Hezbollah and the Badr Organization after it was representing (state versus state). Moreover, it has moved to more apparent forms of presence and intervention, which means more feasible returns, and shortening perhaps decades of slow, gradual work.

The new relationship between the two sides also allowed the transformation of the Iranian contribution to supporting the regime against its opponents into an Iranian self-project – in which Tehran was able to spend and give generously, politically, militarily, economically, and in the media, without waiting for the other side in return, after it has turned into a waiter for the role that can be given to it or the space in which it can move.

In addition, many holy shrines in Syria establish a good motive and reflection for Iran to serve its soft influence interests. Through its movement towards Syria, Iran confirmed that it is a loyal state for those with whom it has religious ties, which serves positively prove the foundation of its expanding regime within the Islamic world under the name “Guardianship of the Jurist.”

However, Iran’s investment in the new project in Syria, which said to have begun in mid-2012, met the most severe challenge when the Russian intervention started in late 2015, even though the intervention posed a real danger to the Syrian opposition and incurred the highest losses since the start of the armed action in Syria. On the other hand, the risk it posed to the Iranian ally was bigger and more serious, shook the foundations of the project itself because Iran is no longer the only player on the regime side. The regime and its various components are not obliged anymore to accept Iran as an irreplaceable option. Also, Iran alone has no right to decide the future of the regime or solution that is acceptable or unacceptable.

Thus, for Iran, the battle in Syria is an existential battle, unlike other political or military ones, as in Bahrain and Yemen. Moreover, Syria was the first land outside Iran to be opened for the Iranian project after the Khomeini revolution in 1979. So the Iranian project in Syria is deeply rooted and profound, compared even with the neighboring project in Iraq, which began after 2003.

Syria was also distinguished, for Iran in all this period, by the stability of the political system, and therefore the relationship since 1979 until now, which is the entire life of the Iranian project, was with one regime, and even with the same people and apparatuses, which gave Syria an additional advantage that Tehran does not have in the rest areas in which it has similar influence or relationships with unstable and conflicting groups, such as in Iraq, for example. However, this exceptional importance of Syria for Iran alone cannot be a sufficient reason to justify the price that Iran has paid so far, even if it is a main and perhaps the only reason for the direct stance taken in 2011 to support the Assad regime.

The Syrian crisis constituted a case of political gambling for many parties, including the Syrian opposition, the Iranians, and others. All parties felt the possibility of achieving their goals quickly, at affordable prices, which prompted them to take the positions they took in 2011 and investing everything they had to achieve their goals. But the passage of time, and the failure of all parties to reach their goals, made the process of retreating any party more difficult and prompted everyone to increase their investment in the crisis despite the high cost and poor achievement to recover the return of the previous investment. This perspective applies to the Iranians more than any other party, as the public entry after 2013, the bringing of Iraqi, Lebanese, and Afghan militias to Syria, led to the abolition of the option of retreat or withdrawal, which became equivalent to the defeat of Iran itself and not the defeat of the Assad regime, and Tehran has no choice but to deal with political and field realities and trying to reduce losses and maximize profits as possible.

Beginnings and mobilization:

The presence of Shiite militias to support the regime in Syria began in 2012, about a year after the Syrian revolution began. It seems that Iran played a pivotal role in organizing the recruitment of these (Shiite) militias from Iraq, Iran, Lebanon in the first place, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and some Asian countries where the Shiites are present, under the slogans: Supporting the doctrine, Protecting the holy shrines, Liberating Jerusalem, Resistance, and Opposition), in exchange for money and other incentives such as the granting of Syrian citizenship.

Lebanese Hizbullah was one of the first militias to intervene and participate in support of the Assad regime, in coordination with Iran, before the presence of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and dozens of Iraqi, Afghan, Pakistani, and Yemeni militias trained by Iran.

The mobilization of Shiite fighters to fight in Syria relied mainly on sectarian and ideological mobilization, which was done by the media and opinion platforms supporting the fighting in Syria, including mosques, Husseiniyas, satellite channels, magazines, newspapers, clerics, and social networking sites. So most of their presence began in Al-Sayeda Zeinab, south of Damascus; Because it is the mainstay of sectarian gathering and mobilization, and then their participation expanded to the rest of the Syrian regions.

Iran worked to provide the military hardware and ammunition needed by the regime army and its militias in the first stage and later to the militias it brought. It also supervised the establishment of the National Defense militias and the management and integrating them into the military institution. The vanguards of the Iranian militias that entered Syria were not new or formed in a hurry but with great tactical combat experience through their experiences in Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. Thus, these militias entered the battlefield upon their arrival, while the new fighters underwent training courses in Syria, under the supervision of Revolutionary Guard officers and officers from the Assad army, benefiting from these experiences to achieve Iran’s strategy of controlling Syria.

Iranian militias entered the battlefields on the various fighting fronts in Syria, sometimes alongside Assad forces on the northern, central, southern, and eastern fronts, and at other times independently, as in the Al-Qusayr area near the city of Homs or the southern countryside of Damascus starting from the Sayeda Zainab area towards the west to Darayya and south to the west of Al-Kiswah. In addition to its concentration on the road between Damascus and the Iraqi border in the east, passing through Al-Dameer, Al-Seen Airport, and Al-Sabaa Biar area, all the way to the Al-Bukamal border crossing. In addition to the concentration of these militias in many important airports and military bases, such as Shayrat Airport, (T4) Airport, Damascus International Airport, Al-Seen Airport, Aleppo Airport, and the Military Academy in Aleppo. The Iranian militias have also taken control of the surrounding areas in scientific research centers, especially in the countryside of Damascus, Jamraya, Al-Saboura, and Barzeh Al-Balad, and in the countryside of Hama in the Masyaf area, and near the city of Aleppo around the Defense Laboratories Institution in Al-Safira, and other areas of strategic importance. In addition to this, all Iranian commanders and officers were present in the operations rooms of the Assad army, in the central headquarters in the heart of Damascus, the unified northern headquarters near Dumeir, the unified northern headquarters near the city of Homs, and the coastal operations room near the Baniyas city, as well as the presence of Iranian military advisors, in most of the military units and formations in the Assad forces.

The first sectarian military militia that set foot on Syrian ground and participated in suppressing the Syrian revolution at the beginning of 2012 was the sniper battalion – belonging to the Iraqi Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq militia, led by one of Iran’s arms in Iraq, Qais Khazali, run by Iran’s rulers – estimated 800 trained and experienced snipers, who deployed on the roofs of government departments and party headquarters buildings to perform the tasks of sniping and killing peaceful demonstrators with live bullets, concentrated clearly in the eastern Ghouta in the city of Douma.

Then this militia deployed in many rebellious areas and extended to southern Syria in and around Damascus, the southern countryside of Aleppo, the eastern and northern Hama countryside, south of Idlib, Homs, and its country, Daraa, Deir Ez-Zor, Albukamal, and Al-Mayadin. These militias are managed by a single central operations room, made up of Iranian officers and officers seconded from the Syrian General Staff and the Syrian security apparatus.

The entry of members of these militias was carried out under the direct supervision of the security apparatus of the Assad regime through the airports and land border crossings with Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan. In the form of individuals or groups, sometimes under cover of pilgrims or visitors to Shiite shrines and shrines, or forged work contracts that facilitate their exit from the countries from which they came, and some of them entered with Syrian passports issued by the Department of Immigration and Passports in Damascus. Iran is still establishing an air bridge to transport these mercenaries to Syria, despite the significant decline in military operations in Syria and the re-establishment of Assad’s control over many parts of the country.

Iran’s military activity in Syria

The number of Iranian-backed Shiite militias in Syria has reached about 50, estimated today at more than 100,000, according to the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Mohammed Ali Jafari. Nevertheless, the number of militiamen remains inaccurate due to the deliberate blackout of the Iranians and the Assad regime. And they are on a noticeable increase. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards, the Quds Force, is carrying out the tasks of financing, arming, and directing these militias. The salaries of its members range from 300 to 700 dollars. Each member of the Afghan Fatimiyoun Brigade takes a monthly salary range from 500 to 1500 US dollars, which is the highest wage among other militias, whose salaries range from 300 to 700 US dollars. While local Syrian militias receive the lowest wages, with fighter salaries not exceeding 100 US dollars.

Accordingly, the Shiite militias in Syria are classified, according to the origin of their members, into four groups: Iraqi, Lebanese, foreign militias (Iranian, Afghani, and others), and fourthly, local militias (Syrian).

The most significant brigades of Shiite militias in Syria:

• Zainabiyoun Brigade: consists of Pakistani Shiites.

• Haydariun Brigade: consists of Iraqi Shiites.

• The Fatemiyoun Brigade: consists of Afghan Shiites who are refugees in Iran. This brigade consists of several divisions.

• Hezbollah Brigade: It consists of Lebanese Shiites brought by the Revolutionary Guard to fight in Syria or from Syrian Shiites; this brigade consists of two parts:

1. Hezbollah, Lebanon.

2. Hezbollah Syria: It consists of the people of Damascus, Nubl, and al-Zahra.

First: Iranian Shiite militias

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard: an Iranian military organization was established on orders from Khomeini in Iran in 1980. It consists of two million volunteers in the peace and reaches three million volunteers in the war, and its task is to protect the revolution in Iran.

The Quds Force: belongs to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which was under the Qassem Soleimani leadership and is now under Ismail Kaani command. Its main task is to implement Iran’s policy outside the borders.

The number of the IRGC and Quds force in Syria is estimated at 8000 fighters and experts deployed in the countryside of Damascus, Tartous, and Latakia. They started their work In Syria by suppressing the protesters against the Syrian regime and providing training to the regime’s members to teach them how to repress the protests. Then their actions evolved into participating with the regime’s forces in its battles against the armed opposition factions. And it is the main force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Syria. It is responsible for leading and securing the combat operations of all Iranian militias in Syria, and its main headquarters is at Damascus International Airport.

The Fatemiyoun Brigade: is a military brigade made up of Afghans fleeing to Iran from the Hazaras (a group of the Afghan ethnic minority). It participated in the fighting in Syria, and its mission was limited to protecting the Shiite holy sites and shrines scattered in the country. The brigade was established in 2014 under the leadership of Major General “Ali Rida” Tawasali,” who was killed in Daraa in the fights against the opposition factions in 2015. This militia participated in the battles of Deir Ez-Zor and Albu Kamal against ISIS.

The number of the brigade’s fighters reached 4,000, according to the claim of Sayed Hassan Husseini, nicknamed Sayed Hakim, a deputy commander of The Fatemiyoun Brigade.

The main headquarters of this militia in Iran is the city of Mashhad. Its headquarters are in Syria, the Sayyida Zainab area, south of Damascus. It is funded and trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in training camps inside Iran.

Zainabiyoun Brigade: was established in 2015, consisting of Pakistani Shiites, mostly Pashtuns and Parachinar (an ethnic group found in Pakistan and Afghanistan), and its founder, Muhammad Jannati, nicknamed Hajj Haider, a Pakistani who was killed in Hama while fighting against opposition factions.

Zainabiyoun deployment is concentrated in Damascus and the nearby suburbs to protect the shrine of Sayyida Zainab. They participated in the battles with the Syrian regime forces against the opposition factions in Aleppo, Daraa, and Hama, numbering about 1,000 fighters.

The brigade had defected from the Fatemiyoun Brigade after its large number. They receive military training in Iran by leaders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in nine training camps inside Iran.

Upon completion of the training, they receive permanent resident status in Iran, an education sponsorship for their children if they die, and a salary of up to $1,200. Some of them were granted Syrian citizenship and then sent to Syria.

The most prominent places of deployment of Iranian forces

• Damascus International Airport:

Iran has established a military base on the campus of Damascus International Airport. It is considered the most important seat of Iran in Syria, and the Revolutionary Guards are concentrated there, besides stockpiling the most significant military equipment and weapons.

• The Imam Ali base:

Iran has equipped several military bases in Syria, the largest of which is the Imam Ali base, south of the city of Albukamal in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor, near the Syrian-Iraqi border. The base extends over a large area of ​​up to 20 square kilometers, and it consists of underground warehouses almost covered by desert nature. Also, it has dirt roads linking warehouses and rooms designated for the residence of fighters and is under Iraqi Hezbollah control.

• The Lajat base:

Since 2018, the Syrian Hezbollah (which recruits members of the Lajat Bedouin, the people of the area, the most of whom are former opposition fighters from the former Omari Brigades and the Tribal Army) has started to equip a military base in the town of Al-Masika in the rugged Lajat area in the northern countryside of Daraa, after The Syrian regime forces’ control over southern Syria.

Through its militias, Iran controls several significant hills in southern Syria. Such as Tal Mar’i, Talul Fatima, Tal Ayoub, Tal Qarin, Tal Al-Hara, Tal Al-Jabiya, Tal Jamou’, Talul Al-Hamr, and Tal Al-Za’atar, which are used by advanced monitoring centers covered by the Syrian regime forces. Movement is with military vehicles and military clothing of the Syrian regime forces. The Fourth Division and other Iranian-backed militias use the headquarters of the Syrian army as temporary operations centers, which are changed from time to time for fear of being targeted by the international coalition or Israeli Air Force.

Syrian private security companies affiliated with Iran

In 2013, Iranian security companies arose from the need for legal armed forces not bound by government regulations. Thus, Legislative Decree No. 55 was issued, a legal guarantee that allows militias to work in Syria and use military force, according to their contract, allowing these entities to operate freely without the need to inform the regime’s army or security branches. Iran has used it to introduce Iranian influence in sensitive Syrian areas, such as Damascus, and operates under the guise of a registered Syrian company. And it has become an ideal way to maintain its presence in strategic locations, such as the highway between Baghdad and Damascus in the eastern desert of Syria. According to the report, Iran planned to deploy almost throughout Syria, using local and foreign militias.

The following table shows the actual military strength and the participation of Iran and its allies In Syria in 2020:

 Military presenceAccessing to the airportsAccessing to border crossingsAccessing the highwaysControlling smuggling points
Iranian Revolutionary Guards expertslargeyesyespassableyes
Foreign militiaslargeyesyespassableno
Local militiaslargeyesyeshighno

Second: Iraqi militias

Thousands of unemployed Iraqi youths became involved in these militias after being deceived by money and religious passion. According to the expert on religious affairs, Hussein Al-Kazemi, there are no volunteer offices in Iran. While dozens were opened in Baghdad, and the cities of the south (with the Shiite majority), affiliated with the Popular Mobilization militias in all its forms, known as Jihad and Defense offices or (Jihad al-Dafa).

Shiite clerics, including Iranians, run these offices, who undertake recruitment and move to Syria for monthly salaries ranging from (300-1500) dollars. According to an Iraqi government source, between (300 to 400) fighters are recruited per month, mostly from low-income family.

Sheikh Haseeb Al-Dujaili said that the volunteers receive a monthly salary, and there are lump-sum rewards from Iran that are paid from time to time. The Syrian government provides food, sleeping places, and all their needs. The Iraqi Ministry of Transport and Communications undertakes the transfer of volunteers to Syria through Baghdad and Najaf airports with free flights under the title (Visiting the holy shrines in Damascus).

These militias are being trained in camps in Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon, but they are also undergo training in camps inside Syria:

• Yafour camp in Damascus countryside, located in a military site belonging to the Fourth Division.

• Al-Sayeda Zainab camp in Damascus.

• Maysaloon School Camp, affiliated with Military Intelligence.

• Naga camp, affiliated with the State Security, one of the most important.

• Shahid Al-Mihrab camp in the city of Aleppo.

• Al-Zahra camp in the city of Aleppo.

The number of Iraqi Shiite militias present in Syria is more than (20) armed militia. The militias (Abu Al-Fadl Al-Abbas) and (Al-Nujaba) are among the most significant and numerous Iraqi militias participating in the Syrian war almost since its start.

The following is a review of the most significant Shiite militias in Syria:

1- Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade militia

It is one of the first and largest Iraqi militias that fought in Syria. The nucleus of the brigade was formed from fighters affiliated with various militias, including (Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, the Badr Organization, the Iraq Hezbollah Brigades, the Mahdi Army, and some Syrian Shiites), and some volunteers from Yemen and East Asian countries.

The first appearance of the militia was in the Sayyida Zainab area of ​​Damascus in mid-2012, under the pretext of protecting the shrine of Sayyida Zainab.

It is well equipped with weapons, vehicles, etc., and is directly under the command of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. This militia enjoys the attention of the Marja in Iran, and it continues to remain in Syria to this day. However, after the fall of the city of Mosul in 2014, some of its fighters were withdrawn from Syria because of the numerical shortage there and the great need for their experience, after that, the Lebanese Hezbollah held their points in Aleppo. The number of militia fighters ranges between (4,500 to 5,000) fighters, and it consists of several battalions named after some of the twelve imams.

Among the most prominent leaders of the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas militia are:

• Aws Al-Khafaji: He is the principal founder of this militia in Iraq and Syria. Al-Khafaji worked as an assistant to the Sadrist movement leader Muqtada al-Sadr in the Mahdi Army, which was affiliated with the movement before its dissolution. He separated from al-Sadr in 2006, and al-Khafaji was arrested in February 2019 by the Popular Mobilization Forces, which he helped found, on charges of opening a fake headquarters.

• Ahmed Hassan Kayara: He was one of the first leaders to lead the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas militia in the battles of Sayyida Zainab, and he was later killed in the Damascus countryside.

• Ali Hassan Ajeeb Jaza, nicknamed Abu Ajeeb Al-Suri: He took over the leadership after the killing of Kayara. He is from the town of Nubl in the northern countryside of Aleppo. Because of some problems between the Iraqis and the Syrians, the brigade leadership was divided, and the Syrians became under his command.

• Haitham Al-Darraji: He is one of the Iraqi leaders, and he is close to the Shiite cleric Bashir Al-Najafi. He led the Iraqi volunteers in the militia.

The Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas militia is deployed in the following Syrian areas:

• Al-Sayeda Zeinab area: the main headquarters of the militia.

• The city of Aleppo: they have stationed points in most of its areas.

• The cities of Nubl and Al-Zahraa in the countryside of Aleppo: It has a strong presence there because of their importance and that their residents are Shiites.

This militia participated in most of the battles alongside the Syrian forces, including:

The Airport Road battles

The Qalamoun battles

The battles south of Damascus

The battle to regain the town of Al-Hujaira, south of Damascus

The Al-Maliha battle that lasted (135) days

The Jobar neighborhood battles

The battles of the Ghouta siege

The chemical massacre committed by the regime in August 2013

The battles of the northern Hama countryside

The battles of Aleppo city in August 2013

Subsidiaries of Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas are:

Zulfikar Brigade led by Haider al-Jubouri and nicknamed “Abu Shahd.” This brigade is considered the most active as it fought in Eastern Ghouta of Damascus, the vicinity of Sayyida Zainab, Qalamoun, Idlib, Aleppo, the southern countryside of Aleppo, Nubl, and Zahraa, and he is the perpetrator of the Nabek massacre.

Qamar Bani Hashem Brigade has about 200 gunmen.

Al-Lutuf Brigade has no more than 150 gunmen.

Masum Brigade.

2- Harakat al-Nujaba Militia (Islamic Resistance Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba)

An Iraqi Shiite militia that branched off from the militia Asaib Ahl al-Haq that split from the Mahdi Army militia in 2006. Al-Nujaba is considered the second powerful Iraqi militia present in Syria and enjoys the attention, care, and support of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. The Iraqis make up most of its members, and there are members from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait. “It fights anywhere ordered by the Supreme Leader,” stated its leader Akram al-Kaabi.

The US State Department has listed the Iraqi al-Nujaba Movement and its leader, Akram Abbas al-Kaabi, on the global terrorist organizations’ list In 2013. Al-Kaabi is distinguished by a mixture of religious and military personalities. He went to Qom to take some religious courses and got a lot of attention from the Iranians. It was the first militia he established in Syria in 2013, under the name of the Ammar bin Yasser Brigade, and then became under The name of Harakat Al-Nujaba.

It was one of the first Shiite militias to send fighters to Syria since its formation in 2013 and has played a growing role in the country, spurred on by recruitment efforts in 2015.

Al-Nujaba militia controls large areas in the southern countryside of Aleppo, and its headquarters is in Rasm Bakour School behind Mount Azzan. It deploys on a front extending from Aleppo International Airport and Al-Nayrab Airport to the town of Al-Hader.

It also has a presence on the outskirts of the capital, Damascus, in the Jobar neighborhood, Al-Nashabiyeh, and on the Harasta road.

The number of Al-Nujaba militias – according to the report of the website “Iran Wire” – is distributed among three military brigades deployed in Aleppo and Damascus, namely:

• (Ammar bin Yasser Brigade), its work area is in Aleppo, to which he moved from Damascus countryside in 2013.

• (al-Imam al-Hasan al-Mujtaba Brigade), its headquarters is in Damascus, to secure the Damascus International Airport Road.

• (Al-Hamd Brigade), its headquarters in the Damascus countryside, specialize in using artillery and missiles.

Before being sent to Syria, the members of this militia undergo a three-month training course in southern Iraq, focusing on using heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and sniper rifles. As well, some of them receive training in Lebanon and then cross over to Syria. At the same time, in Iran, militia members receive specialized training in demining, communications, and operating drones.

The militia leader said that his group uses drones of the type (Yasser), the Iranian version of the (Scan Eagle) reconnaissance plane produced by Boeing.

A report by the Iranian Taghrib News Agency in January 2019 revealed the establishment of a specialized academy to train Iraqi militia members, in which fighters from (Al-Nujaba) and the trainees undergo lessons in the Shiite faith, in addition to advanced intensive military training. Also, courses (higher military studies) were held in Samarra city, north of Baghdad. The report emphasizes that the graduates are enrolled in introductory courses for higher studies. The militia’s most prominent leaders include:

• Akram al-Kaabi, the militia leader and founder, was among the fighters of the Mahdi Army and the Sadrist movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr. He also took over the management of cultural work in Najaf, then was chosen as a leader of the special groups affiliated with the Mahdi Army and then the Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, which splintered from it.

• Hisham al-Moussawi (Abu Warath), the official spokesman for the al-Nujaba militia.

• Haider Jassem Al-Daninawi, who was responsible for recruiting fighters in Iraq, and the Syrian opposition killed him in the countryside of Aleppo in Al-Rashideen neighborhood during a reconnaissance tour.

Some of the most significant battles in which the militia (Al-Nujaba) took part in Syria include:

the battles of Al-Qusayr alongside the Lebanese Hezbollah.

The airport road battles

The Abadieh battles

The Sayyida Zainab battles

The Yarmouk camp battles

The Sheikh Najjar battles in Aleppo

The lifting of the siege on Nubl and Zahraa

The battles of Al-Eis, Khan Toman

The battles of Eastern Ghouta

The battles of Sahel al-Ghab

The battles of Salma

The attack of colleges in Aleppo

The battles of Jibeen and Khanasser

The number of its members ranges from 8 to 10 thousand, and it has a TV channel called (Al-Nujaba Channel) and a news website.

3- Martyr Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr Forces (Badr Organization, the military wing)

An Iraqi Shiite militia, formed in 1982 by Iranian will during the era of Khomeini and considered a military wing of the “Islamic Supreme Council” led by Shiite cleric Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, participated alongside Iran in its war against Iraq, and contributed to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and was accused of liquidating Iraqi cadres and committing human rights violations and fought alongside the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria.

The participation of the Badr Organisation in Syria began in secret by placing its fighters under the command of other militias, such as Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas militia, Sayyid al-Shuhada militia, and Zulfiqar militia, before Badr announced in June 2013 that it was involved in the fighting in Syria by revealing the killing of one of its members in the Sayeda Zainab area. A few days later, the organization leader “Hadi Al-Amiri” announced that his forces were fighting inside Syria. In addition, on July 21, 2013, the Badr Organization officially announced the killing of the organization leader, Abu Dhar Al-Masoudi. After his death, he announced the formation of a militia (the Forces of the Martyr Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr).

In 2015, the Badr Organization announced the opening of recruitment for Shiite civilians to join its ranks, to transfer them to Syria to confront opponents of the Assad regime on the pretext of countering the expansion of the Islamic State and defending Shiite holy sites there. The organization is involved in many battles in the Sayyida Zainab area, the areas south of Damascus, and the eastern Ghouta areas. This organization is active in Syria under the direct command of the Lebanese Hezbollah militia, which has its headquarters in the town of Sayyida Zainab in the countryside of Damascus.

4- Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada militia

The militia (Kataeb Sayyid al-Shuhada) was formed in April 2013 following disagreements between the leaders of (Hezbollah Iraq), which ended with the seceding of Hamid al-Shaibani, nicknamed (Abu Mustafa al-Shaibani) who holds both Iraqi and Iranian citizenship and formatting this militia. Kataeb Sayyid al-Shuhada moved to fight In Syria in August 2013, under Iranian guidance, to stop the friction between the two divided parties, and to protect the Shiite shrines, setting its sights on the protection of the shrine of Sayyida Zainab, which is located in the southern suburb of Damascus.The militia was also tasked with preventing the opposition forces from infiltrating across the dividing line with the regime forces in the eastern Ghouta in the Damascus countryside. It also has close ties with Badr Organization. The militia (Brigades of Sayyid al-Shuhada) was estimated at 700 fighters in Syria. A large number of them have been killed since the beginning of their participation in the battles there. Its most prominent participation was in the battles of the Sayyida Zainab area and the battles of Eastern Ghouta.

5- The Truthful Promise Corps

This militia split from the Mahdi Army in 2006, after its leader, Muhammad Hamza al-Tamimi (Abu Ali al-Najafi), declared his allegiance to Iran and the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist and began raising the slogan (Islamic Resistance in Iraq) like the Shiite factions allied with the Iranian regime. This militia has a military presence in Iraq. In addition to its military activity, it has a media and cultural department. It first appeared in Syria in September 2013, and the number of its fighters was about (2000). It has fought the battles of Damascus countryside, the Qalamoun battles, and the battles of Aleppo and Aleppo countryside. Its combat missions focus, on the side of the regime forces, in Damascus and Aleppo. Also, the militia recently included fighters from Kefraya, Al-Fu’ah, and Ma’aret Ma’areen.

6- Assad Allah Al-Ghalib Brigade militia

A person wearing the Iraqi SWAT emblem, called (Abu Fatima al-Moussawi), announced the formation of this militia in front of Damascus International Airport in December 2013, as for the general field commander of the militia, is Abdullah al-Shabani. He said, “We will support the Syrian Arab Army to liberate Eastern Ghouta and every point in Syria.” He also stressed that he would lead the battles of the Shiite fighters in the Damascus countryside to expel the residents of Eastern Ghouta.

The militia (Assad Allah Al-Ghalib) includes some small organizations, such as the (Ali al-Akbar Brigade), which is smaller than the other militias. The number of its fighters ranges between 300 and 500. This militia participated in the battles of the Sabinah area in the Damascus countryside, the battles of the Sayeda Zainab area, and the battles of Eastern Ghouta.

7- Zulfiqar Brigade Militia

Zulfiqar Brigade was formed on June 5, 2013, on the day of Hezbollah victory over the rebels in the Battle of Al-Qusayr. It is a military organization that split from (Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade), most of which consisted of Iraqi fighters from (Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq) and (Badr Organization). This militia operates under Fadel Subhi’s leadership, nicknamed (Abu Hajar), his current official Abu Shahd al-Jubouri and the military commander Abu Mahdi al-Kinani and his assistant Ali al-Bayati. The number of its fighters is (1000) fighters. Zulfiqar Brigade participated in major battles, namely: the battles of the Sayeda Zainab area, the airport road battles, and the battles in the Adra area, and also participated in the invasion of the city of Nabek.

8- Kafeel Zainab Brigade – Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq

The Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq militia began its activity in Syria by forming Kafeel Zainab Brigade inside Syria in July 2013, under the pretext of protecting the holy shrines. Over the years, the brigade participated in many battles, most of which took place in the vicinity of the Syrian capital, such as the battles of Sayyida Zainab, the battles of Eastern Ghouta, and the battles of Qalamoun, before the field developments forced it to expand its activity outside its geographical framework, moving to participate in the battles of Aleppo in 2016, which at the time received special attention from the former Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani. Although Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq was forced to withdraw its fighters from Syria in 2014 to confront the rise of ISIS in Iraq, its activity quickly returned to chart an upward trend since mid-2015, until its participation in 2017 in the battles to liberate the eastern region In Syria from ISIS. Then Asa’ib settled in three main areas in Syria:

• The first area: the Sayyida Zainab area, south of the capital, Damascus, where the militia is present in three of its bases. It also has approximately 300 members who, alongside the “Imam Ali” militia, are responsible for “protecting the shrine of Sayyida Zainab.” Their leader is the so-called Hajj Khafaj Al-Taysiri, an Iraqi citizen who became famous due to the many infiltration operations that he carried out inside the Syrian opposition-controlled areas in Quneitra.

• The second area: in Deir Ali on the Kiswa road where the 47th Regiment is deployed, including a full force made up of fighters from the Lebanese “Hezbollah” and “Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.”

• The third region: It is the Al-Bukamal border area between Syria and Iraq. According to the available information, there is a headquarters for Asa’ib inside Al-Bukamal city, which is used for recruitment, resettlement, and sending fighters, weapons, and ammunition across the Iraqi-Syrian border. Asa’ib is also stationed at Al-Tufof base in the village of Al-Hari on the borderline, separating between Syria and Iraq, which is a base of strategic importance for the Iranian militias, given its role in facilitating the crossing between Syria and Iraq. It also provides advanced military training for new militia members who have completed their initial training in the use of light weapons and improved their skills in the use of heavy weapons.

Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq is regarded as one of the most loyal Iraqi militias to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. The assassination of Ahl al-Sunnah scholars and leaders in Iraq and Syria is one of its missions. Also, it gets principal funding from Iran and former Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and kidnappings and ransom payments.

9- Rapid Intervention Regiment

The Rapid Intervention Regiment has fewer members than other militias, particularly the Al-Nujaba, Asa’ib, and Badr Corps militias. Most of its fighters belong to the Rapid Intervention Forces (SWAT) of the Iraqi army. This militia is under the leadership of Ahmed Al-Haji Al-Saadi, who is close to Muqtada Al-Sadr, and Ahmed Hassan Kayara (one of the leaders of the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas militia). The Rapid Intervention Regiment participated in the battles of the Sayeda Zainab area, the Airport Road battles, and the battles in the countryside of Damascus.

10- Saraya Tala’a al-Khorasani

It is an Iraqi militia formed in 1984 headed by Secretary-General Ali al-Yasiri. It is considered the military wing of the Islamic Vanguard Party, with approximately 5,000 fighters in Iraq and Syria. Protecting Damascus International Airport, as well as the Shiite holy sites, is its most important task. It receives financial and military support from Iran. The main center is in Najaf. And its branch offices are in Wasit, Karbala, and Basra in Iraq; and the countryside of Damascus; and the countryside of Aleppo, Nubl, and Zahraa in Syria.

11- Iraqi Kataib Hezbollah

An Iraqi organization that sent some of its fighters (7,000 fighters) to Syria in 2013 to protect religious shrines there, led by Hashem al-Hamdani (Abu Alaa), and participated in the battles alongside the Syrian regime forces against the opposition factions. It receives financial and logistical support from Iran, and cooperates with Syrian Hezbollah in military operations in Syria, and also receives military training in Lebanon.

Third: Arab Shiite militias

Lebanese Hezbollah

It is a Lebanese military and political party affiliated with Iran and composed of Lebanese members led by Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. Under the pretext of fighting Israel, it is funded and trained by Iran. It has participated alongside the Syrian regime in suppressing protests on the one hand and fighting opposition groups on the other. In recent years, the party’s goal has been to recruit new members from Lebanon and send them to fight in Syria in exchange for sums of money.

Its recruiting offices are in Haret Hreik, south of Beirut, and in Baalbek and Nabatiyeh. In Syria, the party does not occupy fixed positions and has 117 locations, all of which are spread throughout Syrian territory. It usually uses the military units of the Syrian regime’s army to implement its plans and carry out its activities. The party has civilian homes in the Sayeda Zeinab area, south of Damascus, as temporary headquarters that are changed from time to time. Its members also move around the shrine of Sayyida Ruqayya in the Old City of Damascus, particularly in the Al-Shaghour neighborhood, which has a Damascene Shiite majority, as well as in Al-Qusayr, which it controls and from which it has expelled the population as part of the fighting against opposition factions, from where it has announced its explicit involvement in the suppression of the Syrian revolution and its support for the Assad regime. The party has influence and control over most Shiite factions and is second only to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Syria in terms of control and influence. It is opposed by many Syrian militias because the regime favors Lebanese fighters over Syrians who own the country, which we will discuss in more detail later.

Yemeni Saada Brigade

It is a Yemeni organization of about 750 Houthi fighters who fought alongside the Syrian regime in the southern and eastern countryside of Damascus, some of whom were killed there. Their main mission was to protect Shiite holy sites, but the brigade returned to Yemen after events escalated.

Palestinian Al-Quds Brigade

It is a military organization of Palestinians living in Syria, particularly the residents of Bab al-Nairab camp in Aleppo. It was founded in 2013 by engineer Muhammad al-Saeed with the support of Iran, and its mission is to fight as an auxiliary force alongside regime forces against the opposition factions. It participated in several battles in Aleppo, Damascus, Deir Ez-Zor, and Daraa. Their number is about 3000 fighters. Its headquarters is the Bab al-Nairab camp, and it has training camps in the Handarat camp, Sheikh Najjar, and al-Mallah in the Aleppo countryside.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command

An old Palestinian organization headquartered in Damascus and led by Ahmad Jibril. Its members have fought alongside the regime forces since the protests started in Syria, with more new fighters joining later. It received support from Iran. It took part in the fighting in the Yarmouk and Palestine camps and the southern countryside of Damascus. Many fighters defected from it and joined opposition factions in the Yarmouk camp under “the Free General Command” name, PFLP-GC maintains good relations with Lebanese Hezbollah. The Front receives training in its camps in Lebanon, and the General Command has training camps in Sednaya in the northern Damascus countryside and Al-Sabura in the western Damascus countryside.

Lebanese al-Tawheed Brigades

It is a militia formed by the Lebanese Wiam Wahhab (an ally of Hezbollah in Lebanon). It is present in Syria with no more than 70 members, and its participation in battles has been weak. One of the most prominent battles it participated in was the battle east of As-Suwayda against (ISIS), and it operates under the command of the Lebanese Hezbollah militia.

The “Guardians of the shrine” militia

It was founded in 2013 around the shrine of Sayyida Ruqayyah in the heart of Damascus, near the Umayyad Mosque and the shrine of Sayyida Zainab. Its members are Syrians, Lebanese and Iraqis. Their mission is to protect the shrines of Sayyida Ruqayya and Sayyida Zainab, and their members are 600 armed.

Force 313

It is hiding under the name of National Defense, linked to the Lebanese “Hezbollah” militia, which operates security under a military guise, whose aim is to recruit Sunni cadres and carry out assassinations exclusively in the ranks of the officers of the Assad regime, for those whom Iran does not want. Iran is trying to create an Iranian party in Syria through Lebanese Hezbollah, like the case of the “Hezbollah” militia in Lebanon. This force is under the leadership of Hajj Abu al-Abbas. The officers of this force are trying to recruit youths from the Sunni sect in Daraa and Quneitra governorates to disguise its sectarian nature. The number of this force is between 200 and 250 members. Force 313 participated in the battles of Daraya, the battle of Palmyra, the battles in Western Ghouta, the battle of Aleppo, the battles of Manshiyya in Daraa, and the battles in the northern Hama countryside.

Fourth: Syrian Shiite militias

Al-Foua Brigade

A military organization, the majority of whose fighters belong to the Shiite sect. It consists of 300 fighters from Al-Foua town who receive military and logistical support from Iran and fight as auxiliaries for regime forces.

Al-Zahra Brigade

A military group from al-Zahraa town in Aleppo receives military and logistical support and training from Iran and fights as an auxiliary force for regime forces.

Al-Abbas Brigade

A military group from the towns of Kefraya and al-Foua, consisting of about 200 fighters, receives support from Iran and fights alongside the Syrian regime.

Shaheed al-Mihrab Brigade

A military group from the town of Nubl, consisting of about 150 fighters, receiving support from Iran, and fighting alongside the Syrian regime forces.

Syrian Hezbollah

A military organization of some Syrian militias (they were called the People’s Committees and National Committees that have deployed in Syria since 2013) and its security cadres are led by Ibrahim Aqil (one of the leaders of the Lebanese Hezbollah).

It fought alongside the Syrian regime forces, deployed in the centers of the governorates. It receives military training in Lebanon, in addition to financial support from Iran. Syrian Hezbollah attracted some reconciliation factions to it in exchange for financial aid and protection.

Al-Bustan Association

On the surface, it is a charitable organization, founded in 1999 and linked to Syrian businessman Rami Makhlouf (a cousin of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad). When the protests erupted, it transformed into an organization of volunteers participating in suppressing the demonstrators and fighting alongside Syrian regime forces. The association supported “spreading the Shiite sect” after the Iranian incursion into Syria, and helped build Husseiniyas and Sharia schools, and held Shiite celebrations in the coastal region and Damascus.

After Syrian regime forces took control of southern Syria, several groups close to Syrian Hezbollah emerged. The main groups close to Syrian Hezbollah include:

• Al-Areen Brigade: A military organization from the people of Daraa, based in Al-Kashef neighborhood in the city of Daraa, with 600 members, led by Waseem Maslameh. One of its tasks is to fight alongside the Syrian regime within the Daraa governorate. It receives funding from Iran and by drug-trafficking operations for the benefit of the Lebanese Hezbollah.

• Dira al-Watan Brigade: about 400 fighters, based in the city of Daraa. It is a military organization affiliated with Iran, led by Tariq Maarouf. The number of its forces increased after the Syrian regime took control of the south.

• The Khaled Al-Hashish Group: was formed of the reconciliation combatants, led by Khaled Al-Hashish, who is close to the Fourth Division. Its main headquarters is in the town of Tel Shehab in the western countryside of Daraa. Its fighters are deployed in the border area with Jordan in the towns of Tal Shehab, Al-Tabariyat, and Zayzoun.

• The Abu Salem Group: is 300 fighters, led by Ahmed Mahawish, nicknamed “Abu Salem Al-Khalidi.” Its main headquarters is the town of Khirbat Al-Shahem. It is also stationed in the towns of (Al-Ajami, Al-Fawwar, Khirbet Qais, Nahj) and works in smuggling drugs to Jordan for the benefit of the Lebanese Hezbollah.

• Haitham Abu Saifan Group: is about 200 fighters, headed by Haitham Abu Saifan (a former member of the military security, currently working for the Lebanese Hezbollah). The group deployed in Al-Shajara town and the surrounding villages on the border with the Golan in the west and Jordan in the south in an area called (the Yarmouk Basin).

• Majd al-Malouhi Group: a newborn military organization in the Lajat area in the northeastern countryside of Daraa, affiliated with Hezbollah. Most of its members are from the reconciliation factions (formerly the Omari Brigades), numbering about 200, and they are active in drug smuggling.

• Samer Al-Hariri Group: A recent military organization of 200 members of the reconciliation factions (formerly Amoud Houran Division), led by Samer Al-Hariri (former military commander in the Free Army), based in the town of Bosra Al-Harir in the eastern countryside of Daraa.

• The Muhammad al-Haraki Group: a recent military organization led by Muhammad al-Haraki. The number of its members is about 100 (most of them are reconciliation combatants) in the town of al-Maliha in the eastern countryside of Daraa.

• Faris al-Huwaila Group: a recent military organization consisting of reconciliation combatants, and it is about 100 members, led by Faris al-Huwaila, based in the town of Ghasam in the eastern countryside of Daraa.

• Ali al-Athba Group: a recent military organization formed of the people of Busra al-Sham in the eastern countryside of Daraa, led by Ali al-Athba.

• Khader Hlehel Group: It is stationed in the town of Al-Rafid in the middle of Quneitra on the border strip with the Golan. It consists of reconciliation combatants (formerly Al-Sibtin Brigade).

• Ahmed Kabol Group: It consists of combatants loyal to the Syrian regime in Khan Arnabah in the northern countryside of Quneitra.

• Moaz Nassar Group: It consists of reconciliation combatants from Jubata al-Khashab town and its surroundings.

• Basel Hassoun Group: It consists of the “Druzes” of the town of Hader in the northern countryside of Quneitra.

• Abu Ghadir Group: It consists of reconciliation combatants, formerly a group affiliated with the opposition, located in the town of Ghadir al-Bustan in the southern countryside of Quneitra.

• Daher Al-Hamad Group: It consists of reconciliation combatants, formerly a group affiliated with the opposition in Sayda Al-Golan in the southern Quneitra countryside.

Iran is trying to expand its military activities, especially in southern Syria, by attracting more fighters through encouragement for protection, money, and intimidation with threats and arrests. The following map shows the locations of Iranian and Shiite militias and forces in Syria:

The locations and presence of Shiite forces in Syria

Shiite militia losses in Syria

There are no documented figures for injuries, but some official websites have published the ends of these militias. According to the Iranian opposition movement (Mujahideen-e-Khalq), it has received information from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps that the losses of the guards and militias consisting of Lebanese, Afghans, Pakistanis, and Iraqis have totaled more than 10,000 dead, not counting the wounded, prisoners, and equipment.

The future of Shiite militias in Syria

The continuation of Shiite militias in Syria could be part of the demographic change that the regime and Iran are seeking, especially since the Syrian environment is conducive to such expansion and change. The commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard on 16. January 2019 stated that Iran would maintain its military presence in Syria to challenge Israeli threats to target it if it does not get out of there, taking advantage of the Assad forces’ urgent need for combat personnel after the regime army’s heavy losses and waves of escape and defection. Moreover, even after the end of the actual fighting with the opposition forces in most parts of Syria, the militias still have tasks in the service of the regime, as there are calls to control the belt around the capital Damascus and to form a belt similar to that of Baghdad, as the Chief of the General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, “Mohammed Bagheri,” stated, “Iran and the Syrian regime will continue their military attacks on Eastern Ghouta in order to secure the capital belt ….” bypassing the 2017 de-escalation agreements and the 2018 Security Council resolution (2401).

In order to establish the continuation of these militias, the Syrian regime issued decisions stipulating the confiscation of lands and properties of the dissidents and distributing of some of them to affiliates in the army, security services, and militias fighting in Syria, especially after a statement by the President of the regime, Bashar al-Assad, in which he said, “Syria is for those who defend it, whatever their nationalities are.” There have also been many leaks about granting Syrian citizenship to militia members in different regions of Syria, and their remaining in Syria could be under certain conditions. It seems that one of the future roles of Shiite militias fighting in Syria is to threaten neighboring countries, whether it is Turkey, Jordan, or Israel, using it as a bargaining chip and using it in any upcoming negotiations with Iran.

The foreign militias were present in agreements with both Israel and Jordan. After Israeli airstrikes on the Iranians in Syria, a Russian-Israeli-Iranian agreement was reached to keep the militias 85 kilometers away from the occupied Golan Heights, with responsibility for these areas transferred to the regime’s forces. Syria and Jordan also helped reach an agreement for Syrian opposition heavy weapons to be handed in and a safe withdrawal in return for Shiite and Iranian militias not specifically invading the areas of Daraa and Quneitra near the Jordanian border. The scenarios of Shiite presence in Syria are linked to several factors, the most important of which are:

• The Russian presence: Russia has gained the upper hand in the alliance that supports the regime and is already more influential and more present in the international arena than its Iranian counterpart.

• The American position: if Washington pursues a genuine policy to limit the Iranian role in the region and in Syria in particular, this could weaken the Iranian presence in Syria or exorbitantly increase its costs.

• The political solution that all parties can reach: The form of this solution is affected by the roles and positions of all actors, including Russia and America, in addition to other regional parties such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and even sub-state actors such as the Kurds and opposition factions.

It is also assumed that Iran will reevaluate its strategy in Syria in order to realistically face the regional and international changes, to meet the necessities of confrontation with its competitors and adversaries, and to activate coordination operations with its allies if it is indeed willing to maintain its presence in Syria. Iran is currently facing a dangerous situation in light of the ongoing Israeli military escalation at a time when Iran appears hesitant and afraid of the repercussions of confronting Israeli attacks by using its long-range missiles, which are capable of achieving precise strikes against sensitive Israeli targets. This hesitation shows Iran’s fears of slipping into extensive war with Israel, with the possibility of an expansion of the theater of operations and the intervention of the United States in the conflict. The Iranian leadership also knows that its spread across a broad front, extending from the Gulf to Syria, will not allow it to mobilize the necessary military forces to wage an equal battle, whether in Syria or at the regional level, with the repercussions that will have within Iran itself. In the context of anticipating the future of Iran’s military presence in Syria, the following scenarios can be envisaged:

1. Russian-Iranian consensus

Russia and Iran agree to share tasks and influence in the area that will be under the control of the Assad regime, similar to the current situation in which the Russian side is responsible for general military and political affairs, while the Iranian side takes care of the details of daily life and the structure of the political, security and social system. In this scenario, it is possible that the United States will not put pressure on Iran to withdraw from Syria but will try to confine it to the Assad region and prevent it from expanding outside it, leaving the Russian side responsible for controlling the ambitions of its Iranian partner and ensuring that it abides by the regional and international agreements that have been reached. Iran also guarantees Hezbollah and the Shiite militias a good exit with the most significant political and military gains that can be brought to Lebanon and Iraq. It may also secure a partial crossing over the Iraqi border by which can reconnect the Shiite crescent, even at a minimal level. Iran will also try to make the best use of the space left by Russia by not interfering in many details and by pushing for an expansion of Russia’s available boundaries. This policy will permanently shape its foreign policy. This scenario represents the best options currently available to Iran. Even though it is less than the unacceptable minimum in 2011, it may be subject to some changes depending on the interplay of the determinants of the previous scenarios.

2. Leaving Syria

Iran, because of the high cost it has paid in the war, rejects any compromise on its presence in Syria, and decides to embark on the adventure of maintaining its military presence and facing the possibility of open war with its adversaries there, especially Israel. In this scenario, Russia and the United States agree to expel Iran from Syria in exchange for the release of Russia’s hand in the Assad region and the expansion of that region’s influence to new areas that it does not now encompass. If Iran is driven out of Syria, Hezbollah and the other Shiite militias will also leave, and we could witness international focus on the role these militias have played in recent years, and calls for prosecution or accountability of some of the perpetrators of war crimes from these militias, and that scenario has no data at this point because it does not appear that the U.S. government has any intention or any genuine desire at this point to put pressure on Iran to get it out of Syria or even to limit its influence there. The Kremlin also seems unwilling to abandon its Iranian partner, which provides it with the human energy it needs on the ground, and is unwilling to replace it with Russian soldiers. This scenario also assumes that Israel will intensify its attacks against Iranian bases and forces and its foreign militias in the face of continued Russian-Israeli complicity and the Syrian regime’s inability to help limit the consequences. Therefore, Iran will decide to withdraw a large number of its forces and militias, retain a limited number of advisers, and make its Shiite militias available and under the supervision of the Syrian leadership.

3. Expansion and control

In this scenario, Iran will be able to expand its control in Syria after reaching an agreement with the United States in which Iran guarantees American interests and the interests of key neighboring countries in return for allowing Iran to reach the southern region and the Deir Ez-Zor governorate, which Iran is currently seeking, despite Iran’s importance to the areas controlled by the Assad regime, particularly with regard to its connection to the Lebanese border and its possession of the entire Syrian seaside port. However, the interruption of communications with Iraq and the loss of oil, gas, and basic agricultural and water resources (in the Hauran Plain, Hasakah, and Raqqa) make these areas economically vulnerable. Iran is trying to use the surplus forces it now has in Syria, especially after the cessation of hostilities with the opposition, and the surplus forces in Iraq to support the American project of getting rid of ISIS for domestic political reasons, more than for reasons related to security and balance in the region, which opens the way for those who are willing and able to contribute the actors in the region to achieve this goal, in a repeat of the scenario of Shiite support for the US forces in Iraq in 2003, which achieved the goals of the US administration at the time, regardless of the future of Iraq, that was not important in the US strategy.

Although coalition forces have repeatedly targeted regime forces and Iranian militias, politically, this does not represent a complete U.S. rejection of the scenario but rather a reaffirmation of the American line and a refusal to expand influence without prior political consensus. But the main obstacle to this project will practically be the countries in the region that will put the brakes on any American agreement in this context, as Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey reject such a role and will work to ensure that the Americans do not respond to Iran’s offers to cooperate in the war against ISIS or to expand eastward and southward.

4. Geographical quotas

This scenario suggests that Iran is realistically and rationally inclined to accept the geographic quota system enacted by the Astana talks and the movements of active countries in Syria so that the northeast represents US-Western influence with its direct and indirect presence through the US-backed Kurdish People’s Protection Units, and the northwest represents direct and indirect Turkish influence through the opposition factions, and all of Syria came under Russia’s diplomatic and military air control. Regarding the apparent Iranian influence, it is in the center of Syria, especially in the southern part of the Badia from east to west and the surroundings of Damascus. Here, this scenario differs from the Lebanese and Iraqi cases in the absence of the “militia” military force striking in the name of Iran and the limited political and geographical influence. Against the backdrop of this scenario, a clear tendency towards soft methods emerges, in particular the institutional political, security, and economic penetration of the public and private sectors, relying on strengthening its presence by maintaining the centrality of its movement between Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, reinforcing this axis with long-term economic support and consolidating it through supportive media discourses.

However, it is too early to distinguish between these scenarios or to give preference to any of them, as the matter is related to the course of the upcoming negotiations with Washington, especially concerning the demands of Israel and the Gulf states, which call for a complete halt to Iran’s nuclear program, a change in Iran’s expansionist behavior toward the countries of the region, and the withdrawal of its militias and Revolutionary Guards from the current intervention areas stretching from Yemen through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that the role of the Shiite militias in Syria has significantly helped the survival of the Assad regime since 2012 until now until Russia intervened with its powerful air force after these militias failed and were unable to confront the Free Army factions, who had liberated more than 70% of Syrian territory, and despite the availability of the material and moral support for these militias, they were defeated by the strength and will of the Free Army before the radical factions hijacked them and those who controlled the official institutions of the opposition conspired against them. The greatest danger posed by these militias is that they will help enforce security and military penetration in the ranks of the Syrian army, in addition to the social, economic, and intellectual penetration of Syrian society, because this penetration will achieve the strategic goal of the mullahs in Tehran to bring about a demographic change in Syria, based on what is happening right now. The Syrian crisis has international twists based on the principle of influence that maintains a relative balance of power between active states, especially Iran, which is under intense regional and international pressure because of its presence in Syria.

In this context, the Syrian structural equation between the regime and the people, together with the course of regional and international equations, plays a significant role in making Iran think about an optimal mechanism to maintain its geopolitical and geo-economic strategic influence in Syria. Given this, it seems that the scenarios involving the mechanisms of building soft influence, such as the soft institutional and social penetration, and adjustment to the geographical quota equation, are the most realistic foresight.