Prepared by: Muhammad Sulayman
Introduction:
This study aims to present an objective analytical presentation of the reasons for Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria, the purpose of this intervention and the places of its spread, in addition to the possible scenarios for its presence. Hezbollah’s entry into the side of Assad’s forces began in 2011, by providing advisory services to the regime’s forces and its security apparatus, it was inclined to conceal its field participation in the storming of cities and towns by the Assad’s tanks, and even delayed in declaring a clear political position on the popular movement, until gradually took attitude to announce its complete political alignment with al-Assad, and later its official military participation in April 2013, during the Qusair battle in Homs, in practice, it was responsible for pro-regime propaganda programs in the Arab region. Over the years of the Syrian conflict, Hezbollah has strengthened its military presence in almost all the Syrian governorates, either by the direct presence in some of them or through local networks and militias that owe its allegiance.
The party had no other choice but to engage in the field battle in Syria. All the goals that can be monitored from the decision to enter Syria are necessarily Iranian. Instead, Iran’s calculations and Hezbollah’s role concerning it as its advanced arm in the Arab Mashreq dictated Tehran to decide to enlist all its non-Iranian forces to participate directly in the war in Syria. To prevent the fall of the regime and the establishment of a hostile regime, Hezbollah had nothing but implementation.
Hezbollah’s motives for participating:
The motives for Hezbollah’s participation in Syria are part of the Iranian motives for this participation. However, the party can benefit from some of these motives associated with it to justify its participation within its inner circle and among its popular supportive base, and the most prominent of these justifications are:
First: that any government in Damascus is necessarily able to define some elements in the equation of the balance of power inside Lebanon, which is directly reflected in the party that was born and grew up with Syrian support comparable to Iranian support.
Second: The sectarian identity of the Syrian regime is a relative guarantee of the regime’s continued commitment to Hezbollah in Lebanon, no matter how much its international relations improve.
Third: The collapse of the Assad regime represents a loss of the main supply line for the party, as Iran uses Syrian territory as an operating and supply station for the party and has freedom of movement that it does not have in Lebanon despite all the capabilities of the party there.
Fourth: The Iranian project which Hezbollah cannot think outside its perspective or manoeuvre on its margins is based on the so-called “Shiite crescent”, or land communication between Tehran and the Mediterranean, which means the need to preserve the Assad regime, especially since it is in its weakest conditions are easy to extract some concessions from him, which was not possible in the time of its strength.
Fifth: Iran’s direct and complete support for the Assad regime, and its adoption of the battle to protect it, make it an existential war for the Iranian project, however, if Tehran succeeds in achieving its goals there, this will necessarily mean success for Hezbollah, which works at the order of the “guardian of the jurist” and is fully financed by Tehran, according to the statements of the secretary-general of the party himself.
The following are the main objectives of Hezbollah in intervening in Syria:
• Preventing the fall of Assad by providing the necessary protection for the capital and its surroundings.
• Securing and ensuring the protection of the land supply routes linking Iran and Lebanon and passing through Syria.
• Providing the necessary protection for the Shiite community in Syria, supporting it, and benefiting from it in the recruitment and formation of the Syrian Hezbollah.
• Providing the necessary protection for Hezbollah’s areas of control in Lebanon by establishing a depth and security belt along the Syrian-Lebanese border and serving as an alternative supply corridor for the Bekaa and Mount Lebanon areas.
• Strengthening the presence in the Syrian south and thus forming an advanced operations base on the Israeli borders that would constitute pressure in the event of entering into any negotiations with the Israeli side or in the event of an Israeli escalation.
• Full support for the policies of Iran and the Syrian regime on all levels.
• Supporting and protecting the supply and communication lines between Shiite militias, especially Iranian ones, during military operations.
Beginnings and Intervention:
The Lebanese Hezbollah did not delay in responding to the Assad regime’s call to help it confront the popular uprising in its infancy, supported by a strict Iranian decision in this regard. However, its unwillingness to announce this aid, according to the indications we mentioned a little while ago, to preserve a large part of its popularity and the relations it gained from the wars it fought with “Israel” made it gradually engage in the Syrian war in public over the two years. Also made it gradual in its statement of the motives and reasons for participation, it presented different versions of this statement to suit its gradation in the announcement of its participation.
The party’s participation gradually developed. In the first months, the party began participating with the regime’s soldiers in the crackdown on demonstrators through snipers, in complete secrecy, through the elite foreign unit 910 that was stationed in southern Syria, and it continued to deny the presence of any of its members in Syria despite the frequent evidence of that. Its media apparatus also participated heavily in promoting the narratives against the popular movement and achieved greater success than the regime’s apparatus itself, as its media professionals are more able to deal with an environment characterized by political differences, which limited the contradiction from the regime’s media professionals who have only experienced the unilateral and absolute totalitarian environment.
After that, the party participated in field battles in small numbers. However, this participation expanded in 2013 after the battle of Al-Qusayr when the regime launched coordinated attacks on the cities and towns of Qalamoun and the countryside of Homs adjacent to the Lebanese border. The symbolic participation turned into actual participation, Announcing its fight in the battles became an urgent necessity, given that its members would take over the main task in some of those battles, so it resorted to promoting propaganda, saying that there are villages in these areas inhabited by Lebanese Shiites who are exposed to danger by what it calls “takfiris”. Then it moved to talk about the desecration of shrines and graves of the Ahl al-Bayt buried in different parts of Syria, calling on its members to defend the “holy shrines” propaganda that included all foreign Shiite militias run by Iran. Now this narrative disappeared from the political discourse in 2014, but it remained present among the popular supportive base to mobilize fighters and justify the human losses among them.
The number of Hezbollah fighters in Syria has gradually escalated and is believed to have swung up and down, as it was at its height in 2014 and 2015 when the Syrian regime was at its weakest before the Russian intervention. Today, the party is believed to have between 2,000-4,000 fighters inside Syria.
The party has also worked since 2012 to establish a Syrian branch in the Shiite areas of Nubl and Zahraa in north Aleppo, Foua and Kefraya in north Idlib, and Busra al-Sham east of Daraa and others.
The option of continuing silent participation was not available to the party for several reasons, the most important of which is the successive human losses of the party in parallel with the limited popular support for it in an already small country. Therefore, its participation in Syria will turn into an issue of public opinion, especially in the light of great division among Lebanese politicians towards the Assad regime. It is also believed that Iran pushed for overt positioning after it became clear that it was unable to resolve the battle within weeks or months, and thus pushed the party to present a complete account of the participation and its motives, rather than allowing others to do so.
The following highlights a timeline of the most important battles in which Hezbollah participated and intervened in Syria:
Timeline of Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria
May 2013
Hezbollah, along with Assad’s forces, launched an attack on the strategic Syrian city of Qusair on the Lebanese border, and Hezbollah Secretary-General Hasan Nasrallah announced its official participation in the war and the Syrian conflict after taking over the city after a week of fierce battles.
June 2013
Hezbollah began expanding its participation and transferring its fighters to the city of Aleppo to participate in the combat operations there alongside the Assad forces. The party spread in many locations in the north and south of Aleppo.
February 2014
Hezbollah participated alongside Assad’s forces in the battle to regain control of the strategic city of Yabroud and managed to do so in March 2014.
January 2015
The Israeli air force targeted a car carrying a group of Hezbollah members in the Al-Amal farm in Quneitra, killing seven Hezbollah members, including the leader, Jihad Mughniyeh.
December 2015
The party participated in the first battle of Khan Tuman.
February 2016
Hezbollah participated in the battle to break the siege on the towns of Nubl and Al-Zahraa in the countryside of Aleppo alongside Assad’s forces and was able to break the siege on February 6, 2020.
May 2016
An unidentified plane believed to be Israeli targeted a Hezbollah military site near Damascus International Airport. The targeting resulted in the killing of the leader, Mustafa Badreddine, one of those accused of assassinating the Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafik Hariri.
March 2017
The Israeli air force targeted a joint military site of Hezbollah and the Assad forces near the city of Palmyra in the eastern countryside of Homs, which destroyed weapons shipments that were ready to go to Hezbollah sites in Lebanon.
April 2017
Hezbollah participated in the signing of the agreement to evacuate the four cities, which provided for the evacuation of the cities of Kefraya and Foua, north of Idlib, in exchange for the evacuation of the cities of Madaya, Zabadani, and Serghaia in Rif Dimashq. Which allows the party to take control and deploy along the Syrian-Lebanese border from the side of Rif Dimashq.
October 2017
Hezbollah participated in the battle to regain control over the city of Al-Bukamal on the border with Iraq in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor, along with many Shiite militias and Assad’s forces and was able to take control over the city about a month after the same year.
January 2020
Hezbollah, along with Assad’s forces, participated in the battle for taking control over the Khan Touman area and was able to do so.
Hezbollah’s deployment in Syria:
1. In Aleppo:
Hezbollah is present in 38 independent and joint locations with the Iranian militias and Assad’s forces, such as the Republican Guard and the Fourth Division. The party is often present in military bases and points affiliated with and loyal to Iran within the framework of support and assembly rooms for forces, in addition to its responsibility in almost completely commanding the operations rooms. Hezbollah’s deployment in Aleppo began in mid-2013 and supported the contact lines of Assad’s forces and Iranian militias, and had very active participation in the battles of the southern countryside of Aleppo in late 2015, which allowed it to establish a joint military point with Iran, in addition to its active role, as we mentioned, in raising the siege on the two towns of Nubl and Zahraa in the northern countryside of Aleppo, turning the area into a military barracks belonging to it, in which it conducts recruitment, training, and arming of local fighters. The importance of Aleppo to Hezbollah comes from:
• Supporting Iran’s policies that worked to secure the city of Aleppo from the southern flank and to protect and secure the supply routes between northern and southern Syria, namely the Aleppo-Damascus M5 road and the Athriya-Khanaser road.
• Protecting the defense laboratories, which are considered a distinguished site for the manufacture of weapons and ammunition, including chemical ones, far from the target range of the Israeli Air Force, despite the latter’s attempts to strike this site.
• Considering the fronts in the southern, western, and northern countrysides of Aleppo as an area of advanced operations against the opposition factions in the event of the resumption of battles by the parties to the conflict and thus to protect the depth of the regime’s areas of control or to expand its sphere of influence by controlling new strategic areas in Idlib or northern Aleppo.
• Securing and protecting the areas where the Shiite community is present in Nubl and Zahraa, north of Aleppo, and preparing to retake Kafriya and Foua, north of Idlib if the conditions are right for that.
| Name | Site | Type | the nature of deployment |
| Al-Safira | southern countryside | Military base | joint with the Iranians |
| Jabal Azzan | southern countryside | operations room | joint with the Iranians |
| tractor lab | eastern countryside | gathering center | joint with the Iranians |
| Nubl and Zahra | northern countryside | barracks | joint with the Iranians |
| Al-Hamdania scientific research block al-Rashideen 4 and 5 | Aleppo city | Missile assembly and testing center | joint with the Iranians |
| Kafr Naha | western countryside | Command’s headquarters | independent |
| al-Muhandisin suburbs II 2 | western countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Kafr Naha – Electricity Association Suburb | western countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Anjara – Harsh Bala | western countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Anjara – Bet Darkal | western countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Anjara – Al-saloum | western countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Shekh Ali | western countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Al-Safira | southern countryside | military base | joint with the Iranians |
| Al-Safira – Defense and Scientific Research Laboratories | southern countryside | military base | joint with the Iranians |
| Tal Hasel the south side | southern countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Tal Hasel the north side | southern countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Maarat al-Artik | western countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Tel Arn Road, Tel Hasel | southern countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Dahrat Abd Rabbo | western countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Aleppo, al-Mansoura road | western countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Maarat al-Artik | northern countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Tal Br 2 | southern countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Turkan Village | southern countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Al-Malikiyah Village | southern countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Kafr Hamra | southern countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Al-Layramoun Roundabout Road, Kafr Hamra | southern countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Al-Zahra Town | northern countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Kafr Naha 3 | northern countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Al- Qanater 2 | northern countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Farms of Al-Muhandisin Suburbs I 2 | western countryside | military headquarters | independent |
2. In Idlib:
Hezbollah is present in Idlib within 13 sites semi-independently or in partnership with the militias affiliated with Iran or the Assad forces to a limited extent, noting that all the sites are fighting points on the front lines except for Abu Al-Duhur airport, which is a military base for Iran in which the party is located within the operations room and in the framework of support and mobilization of forces. Hezbollah began to deploy on the fronts of the Idlib countryside after the Syrian regime entered the administrative boundaries of the governorate in early 2018, during the process of taking control of the area east of the Hejaz Railway, in which Hezbollah participated with great effectiveness, and before the signing of the Sochi Memorandum 2018, Hezbollah had summoned its forces in Deir Al-Zour, Damascus Countryside and Homs to redeploy on the lines of contact with the Syrian opposition factions in Idlib, in preparation for an expected military campaign at the time before reaching a bilateral understanding between Russia and Turkey to renew the cease-fire in the de-escalation zone, and in late 2019 Hezbollah redeployed on the contact lines in Idlib, in preparation for the Syrian regime and its allies to launch a military campaign on the region, and although its participation was late in the combat operations, it contributed to breaking the lines of contact of the opposition factions on some fronts. And it is noted that the military points established by Hezbollah in the south and east of Idlib have always been within the framework of combat missions, that is, as battle lines for defenseand attack. The reliance on Hezbollah almost independently in the deployment operations seems to be related to the necessity to cover the depth of Abu al-Duhur airport. And to protect the advanced positions that were controlled on the main supply routes in Saraqib city, in light of the absence of the numerical abundance of fighters with sufficient experience in the Assad forces. In addition to the necessity of stationing in locations close to one of the fighting axes in the vicinity of Kefraya and Foua.
| Name | Site | Type | the nature of deployment |
| Rusafa Junction Checkpoint, east of Saraqib | eastern countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Rusafa | eastern countryside | military headquarters | |
| Rusafa, Maharim Road | eastern countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Rusafa Village, east of Saraqib | eastern countryside | military headquarters | independent |
| Rusafa | eastern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Tal An-Nabariz | eastern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Al-Khawari | eastern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Maharim | eastern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Jubas Village | eastern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Mardikh – Cultural Centre | eastern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Dadikh Village | eastern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Salamin Town, east of Saraqib | eastern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| The former potato market (Suq al-Hal) | eastern countryside | military headquarters | joint with the Iranians |
3. In Hama:
Hezbollah is present in Hama within 4 locations, jointly with the militias affiliated with Iran or the Assad forces, and since Iran established military bases and points in Hama. Hezbollah has sent experts to participate in leading the various military types in the absence of competence or skill Sufficient for local fighters, whether conscripts into the army or forces supporting it, such as the local defense forces.
In late August 2016, Hezbollah participated in defense of the northern countryside of Hama after the large-scale battle launched by the Syrian opposition factions to take control over the area.
In April 2017, Hezbollah participated in the military campaign launched by the Syrian regime and its allies to regain control of the northern countryside of Hama.
In early 2018, Hezbollah participated in the battle to take control of the northeastern countryside of Hama, which is an extension of the area east of the Hijaz Railway.
In early 2020, Hezbollah participated in the battle to take control of the northern Hama countryside after the collapse of the ceasefire agreement in the framework of the Sochi Memorandum 2018.
The importance of the sites in which Hezbollah is located in Hama is that it is the main line of defense for the city and an advanced center for regrouping forces and preparing them to re-launch attacks. Mount Zain al-Abidin has always been an obstacle that the opposition factions could not overcome. Moreover, Hezbollah provides expertise in weapons development operations within Hama Airport.
| Name | Site | Type | the nature of deployment |
| Mount Zain al-Abidin | northern countryside | military base | joint with the Iranians |
| Madrasat Al-Majnazrat (armored vehicles school) | eastern countryside | military base | joint with the Iranians |
| Hama Military Airport | western countryside | military base | joint with the Iranians |
| 47th Brigade | southern countryside | military base | joint with the Iranians |
4. In Homs:
Hezbollah is located in Homs within 11 locations, independently or sometimes jointly with the militias affiliated with Iran. The countryside of Homs, which extends along the border strip with Lebanon, constitutes a security depth for Hezbollah, and for this reason, it officially announced its intervention in the Qusayr battle in 2013, Against the Syrian opposition, which was on the verge of achieving progress in its favor, and since November 2015 the Syrian regime and its allies began a military campaign to take control of the Homs governorate, in which Hezbollah actively participated, whether against the opposition factions or ISIS. The deployment of Hezbollah in Homs is linked to some goals, namely:
• Securing and protecting the presence of the Shiite community in the city and the countryside, for example, preventing the opposition factions for years from reaching the villages of Al-Kum and Al-Mukhtaria.
• Protecting and securing the military supply and transport route between Homs and southern Lebanon.
• Supporting Iran’s policies that worked to secure the supply route between the capital and the Syrian coast through Homs and the supply routes between Tehran and Beirut through the Homs desert.
• Supporting Iran’s policies that worked to restore the Syrian regime’s control over sources of wealth and power.
• Supporting Iran’s policies in manufacturing, stockpiling, and development operations centered in Homs.
| Name | Site | Type | the nature of deployment |
| Al-Ashrafieh | northern countryside | barracks | joint with the Iranians |
| Al-Najma | northern countryside | barracks | joint with the Iranians |
| Military Field Engineering College | northern countryside | military base | joint with the Iranians |
| Palmyra – Dedeman Hotel | eastern countryside | barracks | joint with the Iranians |
| Al-konvai | southern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Al-Bureij Gas Station | southern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| In front of the city of Qara | southern countryside | military headquarters | joint with the Iranians |
| T-4 Airbase | eastern countryside | military base | Independent |
| Al-Sukhnah | eastern countryside | headquarters | Independent |
| Palmyra | eastern countryside | headquarters | Independent |
| Al- Qusair | western countryside | barracks | Independent |
5. In Damascus and its countryside:
Hezbollah is present in Damascus and its countryside within 12 locations, independently, semi-independently, and sometimes jointly with the militias affiliated with Iran. Damascus and its countryside, similar to Homs, especially the areas along the border strip with Lebanon, constitute a security depth for Hezbollah, which has firmly intervened in supporting the Syrian regime’s control over Yabroud in March 2014. Hezbollah has also played a significant role in besieging the cities of Zabadani, Madaya, and Sarghaya from 2015 until the Syrian regime regained control over them under the implementation of the Four Cities Agreement in mid-2018. The party also supported the operations of the Lebanese Army to secure and restore control over the outskirts of Arsal in mid-2017, as well as the operations of the Syrian regime to secure and regain control over the outskirts of Qalamoun on the same date.
In fact, the deployment of Hezbollah in Damascus and its countryside is linked to several goals, namely:
• Securing a direct military supply route between its strongholds in southern Lebanon and Syria.
• Providing safe ways for the trade and cultivation of narcotic substances.
• Supporting Iran’s policies in securing the supply route between the capital and the coast, and between the north and the south of Syria on the M5 road and between the east and the capital on the Damascus-Baghdad road.
• Supporting Iran’s policies in manufacturing, stockpiling, and development operations centered in Damascus and its countryside.
| Name | Site | Type | the nature of deployment |
| Jdeidat Yabous | western countryside | barracks | joint with the Iranians |
| Al-Dimass Airport | western countryside | barracks | joint with the Iranians |
| Part of Al-Drij camp | western countryside | military base | joint with the Iranians |
| Hargla | southern countryside | barracks | joint with the Iranians |
| Al-Sabinah – Air Force Intelligence | southern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Falayta | northwestern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Assal al-Ward | northwestern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Al-Sein Military Airport | northeastern countryside | military base | joint with the Iranians |
| Kanaker | southern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Sargaya | western countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Assal al-Ward | northern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Ras Al-thalajat | northern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
6. In Daraa:
Hezbollah is present in Daraa in 20 locations, independently and semi-independently, sometimes jointly with militias affiliated with Iran and sometimes with the Syrian regime. Since late 2014, Hezbollah has supported the Syrian regime in defending its strongholds in southern Syria, especially the “Triangle of Death” area near the border with the occupied Golan during the opposition factions’ attack on it, as well as in the process of regaining control of it in February 2015.
In March 2015, Hezbollah participated in defending the strongholds of the Syrian regime in the eastern countryside of Daraa, specifically Busra al-Sham.
In July 2018, Hezbollah participated in the Syrian regime and its allies in controlling the entirety of southern Syria after signing a settlement agreement with the Syrian opposition. From the beginning of 2019, Hezbollah supported Iran’s policies in re-signing settlement agreements in southern Syria under new conditions that guarantee the Syrian regime more security, military and administrative control.
The Syrian south constitutes a security depth for Hezbollah in an extension of Iran’s policies that seek to protect the capital and turn it into an advanced area of operations against Israel by supporting manufacturing, development, stockpiling, and training operations. In addition to being a suitable environment for the trade and cultivation of narcotic substances.
| Name | Site | Type | the nature of deployment |
| Izraa | northern countryside | barracks | joint with the Iranians |
| Command Center of the 9th Division in Al-Sanamayn | northern countryside | Command’s headquarters | joint with the Iranians |
| The suburb | Daraa city | barracks | joint with the Iranians |
| Nasib Border Crossing | southeastern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Tal Al-Jabiya | northern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Agricultural airport base – Qerfa | northern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| 12th Brigade entrance | northern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Izraa Cultural Center | northern countryside | Command’s headquarters | joint with the Iranians |
| Izraa sport court | northern countryside | Command’s headquarters | joint with the Iranians |
| Izraa | northern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Rustom Ghazaleh Gas Station | northern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Rustom Ghazaleh olive oil mill | northern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Qasioun University | northern countryside | Command’s headquarters | joint with the Iranians |
| The agricultural airport | northern countryside | gathering centre | joint with the Iranians |
| The shrine of the companion Hudhayfa bin Al-Yaman | northern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Tal al-saghir | northern countryside | military headquarters | Joint with Assad’s forces |
| Tal Al-Miqdad | northern countryside | military headquarters | Joint with Assad’s forces |
| The wells of Tel Al-Farfara | northern countryside | party headquarters | Joint with Assad’s forces |
| Yarmouk University | northern countryside | Command’s headquarters | joint with the Iranians |
| al-Lajat | northern countryside | party headquarters | joint with the Iranians |
| Ip | northern countryside | party headquarters | joint with the Iranians |
7- In Quneitra:
Hezbollah is present in Quneitra within seven locations, with a semi-independent presence and sometimes joint with the militias affiliated with Iran. Since the outbreak of the armed conflict in Syria in late 2011, Hezbollah hastened to deploy special forces in Quneitra near the occupied Golan, such as Tal al-Ahmar. In 2015, it did not hesitate to defend the area against the opposition factions, which were then able to take control over parts of it. Because of Hezbollah’s command of operations in Quneitra, the opposition repeatedly failed in 2016 and 2017-2018 to take control of the entire northern countryside and raise the siege on Beit Jinn. The importance of Hezbollah’s presence in Quneitra stems from its being advanced operations center against Israel through which contact lines can be continuously studied and reconnoitered to know the level of armaments, monitoring, readiness, etc., and that explains the killing of many of the party’s leaders in Quneitra.
Hezbollah also supports Iran’s policies in the governorate by securing the capital and strengthening its presence in southern Syria, which helps expand activities in the grey area to confront the United States of America.
| Name | Site | Type | the nature of deployment |
| The hill of the branch of 90th Brigade | northeastern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Tel Kroum – 90th Brigade | northeastern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Beit Jinn – Tal Ahmar | northern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Western Tal Ahmar | southern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| Eastern Tal Ahmar | southern countryside | military headquarters | Independent |
| 90th Brigade – Air Defense Battalion | eastern countryside | Command’s headquarters | joint with the Iranians |
8. In As-Suwayda: Hezbollah is located in As-Suwayda within three sites with a joint presence with the militias affiliated with Iran. Hezbollah’s presence in As-Suwayda is limited to the areas of the border strip with Jordan to support Iran’s policies in securing and facilitating cross-border smuggling.
The lack of any significant military presence of Hezbollah in As-Suwayda is coupled with the absence of complete security control over the governorate, which is under semi-autonomous rule by the Druze community in the region, who own armed groups working to protect the area against the policies of the Syrian regime, Iran and Hezbollah.
| Name | Site | Type | the nature of deployment |
| Vanguards of the Baath camp – Rasas | southern countryside | Border posts with Jordan to facilitate smuggling operations | joint with the Iranians |
| Al-Hoya Village | southeastern countryside | Border posts with Jordan to facilitate smuggling operations | joint with the Iranians |
| Al-Zulf Dam | southeastern countryside | Border posts with Jordan to facilitate smuggling operations | joint with the Iranians |
9. In Deir Ez-Zor:
Hezbollah is located in Deir Ez-Zor within seven locations with a joint and semi-independent presence with the militias affiliated with Iran, and since 2017, Hezbollah has supported the efforts of the Syrian regime and its allies to reach and take control of the governorates of eastern Syria, including Deir Ez-Zor, according to which control of al-Mayadin was restored in October, Albukamal, and parts of Deir Ez-Zor city neighborhoods in November.
Hezbollah’s presence in Deir Ez-Zor is based on supporting Iran’s policies in the region, which are trying to secure the supply route between Damascus and Baghdad and encircle the Al-Tanf military barracks, and an advanced base in the Euphrates basin, which can help launch any possible attack on the Autonomous Administration’s areas of control east of the river.
| Name | Type | the nature of deployment |
| Al-bukamal – Political Security Directorate – Al-katif farms | barracks | joint with the Iranians |
| suburb district | barracks | joint with the Iranians |
| Hatla – Political Security Directorate bridge | barracks | joint with the Iranians |
| Al-bukamal – Air Force Intelligence | military site | Independent |
| T2 Pumping Station | military site | Independent |
| Al-Mayadin | military site | Independent |
| Al-Mayadin – Al-Rahba Castle from the western side | military site – artillery battalion | joint with the Iranians |
What did Hezbollah achieve from its intervention in Syria?
The party’s military presence in Syria helped prevent the fall of the regime, although it was not possible to know the percentage of this contribution, it naturally failed to help the regime expand its control on the ground. When the party’s extensive intervention began at the end of 2012 the regime controlled less than a third of the land area, but at the end of 2016, it controlled an area less than the one it controlled in 2012. By mid-2017, the pro-Assad coalition almost totally controlled the western countryside of Damascus to the Lebanese border, securing the party’s supply lines, which the party can promote as a direct success for it, even though it was not fighting there alone. The party’s participation in the Syrian war, its experience on the ground, and its mastery of the local language (unlike other foreign fighters, including those coming from Iraq) provided the party uncalculated political gains, as it was able to provide stable bases in regime-controlled areas, and shifted from the task of providing combat services to managing the operations of foreign militias and even supervising the work of the regime’s army itself. The war provided an unprecedented opportunity to train the party’s fighters, as they fought many battles of a different geographic and military nature. They also participated in managing security, information, and media operations in Syria and abroad and provided training and advice to other foreign militias and even the Syrian army itself. And they participated in battles side by side with the Iranian and Russian forces, which gave them military experience at an international level, all of which are experiences that were not available even to the rest of the foreign militias participating in the Syrian war, and the party was not able to obtain them, of course in Lebanon. On the Lebanese side, the party deepened its dominance over the Lebanese state apparatus in recent years due to the presidential vacancy and political stagnation, taking advantage of the war in Syria to target the Sunni community in the north in particular. The party used the presence of Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS in the outskirts of Arsal and Qalamoun and their kidnapping of Lebanese soldiers and civilians to build public opinion in support of its political attitude towards the Assad regime, in which he succeeded to some extent, especially in Shiite and Christian circles.
Hezbollah losses
On the ground: Human losses represented the most significant costs for the party, and some international estimates indicate that the party’s death toll reached approximately 1,500, while the number of wounded reached about 3,000, figures that represent what observers outside the party were able to verify the losses, while the losses maybe are much more than that, and among the party’s dead are dozens of military and security leaders, especially those wanted by the International Interpol, mainly Mustafa Badr al-Din, Jihad Mughniyeh, Fadi al-Jazzar, Hassan Ali Jafal, and Samir Kuntar.
The many human losses, compared to the limited popular supportive base, led to a decrease in the popularity of participation in the war in Syria among the people of this base, this resulted in the reduction of the military parades of the party that accompanied the funerals of its dead in 2014 and 2015, leaving this large number of dead The party had a profound impact on the party’s members, which necessitated a massive campaign from its media apparatus to boost morale among the public, and excessive use of religious messages that encourage them to sacrifice, in parallel with material and service compensation for the families of the dead.
Scenarios for Hezbollah’s presence in Syria
Several indications have emerged recently for the withdrawal of the Lebanese Hezbollah from Syria, some of which are related to Hezbollah’s interests itself, and others are related to the international environment, especially the position of the US administration and even the interests of Russia. Hezbollah also began sending signals towards a conciliatory language with what it describes as “Takfiri terrorist groups,” even the party’s Secretary-General, in his speech on May 11, 2017, addressed the fighters of Fatah al-Sham (Al-Nusra) in a conciliatory language, said to them “You guys. There is no prospect for your battle…so let’s solve this problem…and we are ready, we are Hezbollah… because the Lebanese government is not yet ready to talk with the regime in Syria, we are ready to guarantee a settlement, like all the settlements that happen, and places can be negotiated to which the militants go with their personal weapons and their families, as was the case in other settlements, so let us close this file”. The Secretary-General of the party, who is almost entirely responsible for providing political and media messages that express the party’s point of view, also began by talking about the end of the security and military tasks for which the party went to Syria. In his speech on May 2, 2017, Nasrallah said, “I can say that the Lebanese borders, especially the eastern borders, have left the circle of the military threat, in other words, there are no longer towns, bases, mountains, hills, or locations in the hands of armed groups that can proceed from them to militarily threaten any town or border area along the border by occupying a village or occupying a town, Or by entering the city or something like that.
Even the security threat, I can say that it has receded to a very high and very large degree.” But the first indication by the party to start withdrawing from Syria came in the speech of the Secretary-General on 11/5/2017, in which he announced the dismantling of the party’s military positions on the Syrian-Lebanese border, “because there is no longer any reason for us to be there.”
At the international level, it has become clear that countering and curtailing Iranian and Hezbollah influence is an absolute priority for the US administration. It has specifically urged Iran and its militias to leave Syria and tightened sanctions against the party’s leaders and its financial resources. It is expected that all present and future positions in Syria will be determined based on this priority. It also seems nearly two years after the Russian intervention, that Moscow is seeking to reduce Iranian influence on its behalf, and this is what happened in the eastern neighborhoods of Aleppo, where the Russian bombing forced the opposition factions to make a deal to get out of them, the Iranian and Syrian militias were unable to enter them. Instead, Russian police patrols roamed these neighborhoods in an attempt to reap the fruits of the intervention.
In the latest indication of this policy, the Russian official Sputnik news agency published the head of the Russian delegation to the Astana negotiations, Alexander Lavrentiev, as saying after signing the de-escalation agreement that “ if a stable de-escalation is achieved in the de-escalation zones, including in Ghouta, we can talk about the withdrawal of Iranian factions. ” It is a demand that Putin fully recognizes is primarily American, and could tempt Trump to engage in the agreement instead of opposing it and imposing safe zones according to another plan that the US State Department and the Pentagon are preparing.
Conclusion:
Hezbollah’s withdrawal from its role in Syria is likely to have double effects on its situation in Lebanon.
On the one hand, this expected withdrawal will be a symbolic blow to its prestige in front of its Lebanese partners and opponents and will open the door to possibly being questioned, at least politically, whether by public opinion or by its opponents, given that its withdrawal means an indirect recognition of the futility of intervention in Syria, especially since it will come without achieving the party’s stated goals!
Also, the withdrawal will lead the party to return to the forefront of inter-conflict conflicts and exacerbate these conflicts, which means that it will have to enter into a new political and media front this time, which may be no less severe than the Syrian field front. Its return “broken” from Syria will also help fuel the conflict between it and the Amal Movement, which is contesting him over the leadership of the Shiite community and has chosen to maintain a role closer to neutrality regarding the Syrian crisis. However, its cadres locally do not hide their gloating about the party and its losses.
On the other hand, by its withdrawal from Syria, Hezbollah will restore some of its internal balance that got lost because of engaging in the Syrian war in a way that was not unanimous within the party. In addition to killing many of its members and capturing others, which angered a group of their relatives over the party’s leadership. In addition, its actual separation from the Syrian war may enable him to provoke a war with Israel to restore its collapsed popularity and regroup its angry supporters.
However, if the party returns from the fight in Syria and remains without a battle with Israel for a long time, it will suffer significant political losses, preoccupation with the war of “Israel’s agents”, as it calls, in Syria justified its ceasing to target Israel. In any case, the fight with Israel, as the participation in the Syrian war, is not an internal decision of the party. So it is related to other files, the most important of which is the Iranian nuclear agreement process and the role that Iran can play in Syria in light of international and regional interactions, all of which are unpredictable now.
At the regional level, the party’s withdrawal (whatever the real or stated reasons) will mark a victory for the axis opposing the party’s presence in Syria. And will show that Iran has been unable to protect this presence, especially since it came without Assad being able to regain control of all of Syria.